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Was communism good for social justice?: a comparative analysis of the two Germanies*

ABSTRACT

This paper offers a cross-national comparative analysis of social inequality in the former Federal and Democratic Republics of Germany. Social policy in the GDR reflected a conflict between egalitarian and meritocratic conceptions of justice. Against this background, I attempt to determine whether or not half a century of communism reduced class inequalities of opportunity in East Germany, relative to those in the Federal Republic. I argue that the study of social mobility suggests little progress was made towards achieving this goal. Attitudinal data indicate that the perceived failure of the East German authorities to create a more open society may have exacerbated the problem of regime legitimation.

KEY WORDS: social mobility; social justice; meritocracy; East and West Germany

I

One distinctive feature of David Lockwood's sociology is his emphasis on the comparative method. *Solidarity and Schism* is a clear endorsement of Durkheim's dictum that 'comparative sociology is not a particular branch of sociology; it is sociology itself, in so far as it ceases to be purely descriptive and aspires to account for facts' (Durkheim 1964: 139). In this paper I endeavour to follow David's example by presenting a cross-national comparative analysis of class inequality in the former Federal and Democratic Republics of Germany. More specifically, I attempt to determine whether or not fifty years of communism increased equality of opportunity in East Germany, to a degree greater than that found in its capitalist sister-state to the West.

The German experience offers an unusual research opportunity to students of social stratification. Here was an advanced industrial nation, reduced almost literally to ruins by modern warfare, which was then rebuilt in separate parts according to distinctive socio-political blueprints. One, in the West, continued to follow the capitalist route to economic prosperity. The other, in the East, pursued a communist path in its search for social

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justice. Now, some fifty years later, the results can be examined in detail. In a strict sense this has not been a sociological experiment – but, at this macro level of system integration, it is probably as close to it as we in the discipline are ever likely to come. Certainly, we have been presented with an opportunity for comparative analysis of an especially rigorous kind, in which (to use Melvin Kohn's terminology) the nation-state provides a context for investigating how social institutions operate under varying circumstances; and, in this particular case, the *ceteris paribus* clause describes an unusual situation in which – political regimes apart – most other things were at the outset indeed equal.[1]

My purpose is therefore rather modest. It is simply to determine whether or not one particular communist state delivered on its promise of creating a more open society. I will argue that the study of social mobility rates suggests little progress was made towards achieving this goal.

II

All communist regimes have experimented with a variety of systems of remuneration and distribution in the attempt to reduce inequalities of outcome or condition among citizens. One thinks here, for example, of early Russian drives towards the levelling of wages and benefits; of the short-lived hopes of substituting moral for material incentives in post-revolutionary Cuba; and of periodic (sometimes catastrophic) attempts in China to restructure the allocation of rewards without inducing either economic stagnation or administrative chaos. The long-term consequences of these and other initiatives have been debated at length. There is some evidence – though keenly disputed – that communist redistribution may have diminished inequalities of outcome, as these have historically been evident in the disposition of wealth, health care, housing and the like. However, the jury of international scholarship is still out on this issue, and I do not intend here to anticipate any decisions at which it may yet arrive.[2]

But the communists themselves never mistook egalitarianism for socialism. No less an authority than Stalin insisted that

> Equalitarianism owes its origin to the individual peasant type of mentality, the psychology of share and share alike, the psychology of primitive 'communism'. Equalitarianism has nothing in common with Marxist socialism. Only people who are unacquainted with Marxism can have the primitive notion that the Russian Bolsheviks want to pool all wealth and then share it out equally. (Stalin 1955: 120–1)[3]

In this respect, Stalin and others who wrote in similar vein were simply rehearsing the tenets formulated by Marx himself, who, as is well-known, considered the desert-oriented principle of rewarding each 'according to his labour contribution' to be appropriate to the first or lower (and

present) stage of socialism. This second-best criterion was to be superseded by the maxim 'to each according to his needs' only in a subsequent (and, in the event, never realized) higher stage.[4]

Perhaps ironically, therefore, appeals to social justice in later communist writings typically took the form of the liberal principle of increasing equality of opportunity to earn rewards proportionate to merit. Having conceded that inequalities of outcome, although perhaps diminished, would continue to be a necessary feature of socialist societies for the foreseeable future (at least if economic growth were to be secured), elites then offered the alternative argument that socialism nevertheless promoted distributive justice by giving people more equal access to unequally rewarded positions, in a society still (temporarily and regrettably) characterized by a hierarchy of offices carrying different levels of material advantage.[5]

As Walter Connor (1979: 25) has observed, most socialist societies were therefore characterized by an unresolved conflict between different conceptions of justice, evident in the policy disputes that separated those whom he describes as 'ideological egalitarians' from their 'pragmatic reformist' opponents. Examples abound, but one obvious illustration is provided by Soviet policy towards entry into higher education, which alternated between egalitarian and meritocratic initiatives. What we now call positive (or reverse) discrimination was often practised in the attempt to guarantee equal outcomes in the distribution of university places. Children of workers and peasants were compensated for cultural and other disadvantages by being awarded studentships irrespective of their educational achievements. At other times, performance in competitive examinations was the principal criterion of admission, and the concerns of individual merit were given priority over those of class preference. In this instance, as in other attempts to resolve the tensions between equality of outcome and equality of opportunity, most socialist governments pursued a middle course – 'retaining the promise of greater equality in the future, and claiming that much of it has been achieved, while citing the socialist performance principle as a contemporary guide to reward'.[6]

This tension is sometimes presented as a contrast between two types of mobility that are said to characterize actually existing socialism; namely, collective (or class) mobility and individual (or social) mobility. The former refers to what Wlodzimierz Wesolowski and Bogdan W. Mach (1986: 25, 27) describe as 'the collective mobility of the unprivileged classes'; that is, greater 'equality of conditions', the principle supposedly governing state intervention in the process of distributing goods. Individual mobility, on the other hand, relates to 'mobility through qualifications and occupations [and] posits the creation of similar opportunities for achieving unequally rewarded positions. It derives from the pragmatic and reformist version of socialism or its meritocratic version'. As Wesolowski and Mach concede, Marxist sociologists have been loath to discuss equality of opportunity, on the grounds that Marx himself regarded this as a bourgeois ideal that was

irrelevant to the classless communist societies of the future. However, as they also acknowledge, parity in the chances for individual social mobility was 'an important problematic' in the real socialist societies of Eastern Europe, especially since 'propaganda suggests that there has been a close approximation to the ideal of equal opportunities'.[7]

The meritocratic defence of social inequality under socialism is also a prominent theme in the sociological literature on stratification. For example, in their review of the history and functions of social mobility under real socialism, Wesolowski and Mach (1986: 30) observe that

> During the first stage of a socialist regime, a stress on equality of positions as the main characteristic of the new order is of strategic importance for those in authority. Later a new problem confronts this type of regime. It consists in associating egalitarian promise with mobility through qualifications, in order to foster societal support for an inegalitarian, but meritocratic, system generating achievement motivation and capable of growing and innovating.[8]

Like Connor, Wesolowski and Mach can see a certain lack of clarity in the relationship between these two principles, since equality of opportunity points to individual occupational mobility (mainly through qualifications) while equality of conditions seems to call for collective mobility (secured by state intervention to redistribute resources).

Soviet and other socialist scholars of the post-Stalinist period therefore employed the language of class (or strata) and of class inequality (or differentiation) readily enough. But they steadfastly maintained that there were important differences in the degree of openness in class structures East and West. In particular the former offered far greater equality of opportunity than did the latter.[9] In the late 1960s, for example, M. N. Rutkevitch and F. R. Filippov (1973: 235) argued that 'in a socialist society, as a result of fundamental changes in the social class structure, most of the real barriers to social mobility disappear'. Similarly, in the mid-1980s, N. A. Aitov (1986: 256, 270) conceded that 'socialist society does not yet enjoy full social equality', but concluded from his study of the Russian city of Magnitogorsk that 'socialist society is far more "open" than its capitalist counterpart'.[10]

These assessments were based mainly on the evidence provided by some methodologically suspect studies in particular industrial enterprises, towns, or regions within the former Soviet Union. I have reviewed this rather disparate material elsewhere (see Marshall et al. 1995). By comparison, a summary of the literature on intergenerational social mobility in the GDR is easily compiled, since there is none – or, at least, nothing that has been published or circulated in the West.[11] Most commentators have therefore remained open-minded about the relative inequalities of opportunity in the two Germanies.[12]

Of course, arguments have been proferred about the extent to which equality of opportunity was enhanced under communism or state socialism

generally, and it is not unreasonable to suppose that these were intended also to apply to the GDR. On the one hand, for example, Frank Parkin (1971: 165) has referred to the 'relative openness' and 'high degree of social fluidity' of 'Soviet or socialist type societies', and concluded that 'mobility opportunities in eastern Europe are more favourable than those in the West'. On the other hand, conclusions such as this tend to fly in the face of the most recent evidence, which suggest that the pattern of relative mobility chances (or degree of social fluidity) is basically the same across all industrial societies. For example, having examined the intergenerational social mobility data for a selection of both capitalist and state-socialist societies, David B. Grusky and Robert M. Hauser (1984: 26) insist that their results 'make it quite clear that the cross-nationally common element heavily predominates over the cross-nationally variable one'. Similarly, and more recently still, Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992: 389) have concluded that 'the total amount of the association between class origins and destinations that is cross-nationally variable is only very small relative to the amount that is cross-nationally common'.

Against this background, the lack of reliable evidence for the GDR is particularly unfortunate, since that country provides a potentially critical test case. East Germany was the only state-socialist society (with the possible other exception of the Czech lands within former Czechoslovakia) that was industrialized before communism was established. This is important, because many disputes about the relative openness of capitalist and state-socialist societies hinge upon a disagreement about the extent to which rates of intergenerational social mobility under real socialism were a consequence of communist social policy, rather than of the industrialization process itself.[13] The GDR is not only exempt from this limitation but, as was suggested above, offers the additional bonus of a controlled comparison with the capitalist Federal Republic to the West.

The empirical issue to be confronted here is therefore straightforward enough. Was the 'tremendous openness' of socialist societies, to which writers such as Aitov repeatedly allude, an empirical reality or a delusion of Marxist-Leninist ideology? This is a question to which comparison of the two Germanies provides a particularly appropriate response.

III

I attempt to answer this question using data collected as part of the International Social Justice Project (ISJP).[14] The Federal and Democratic Republics of Germany were included in this study as separate countries about which information was collected by means of nationally-representative random sample surveys of adults aged 18 or above. Interviews were conducted on a face-to-face basis by a professional survey organization during 1991. A response rate of 71 per cent was obtained in each study. This yielded 1,837 and 1,019 cases in the West and East respectively. The

occupational data from these surveys were coded to the German employment status (*Berufstellungen*) and the *1968 ISCO* (International Standard Classification of Occupations) categories, to which specially designed algorithms were then applied, in order to generate Goldthorpe (or 'CASMIN') class variables which were cross-nationally comparable.

What does the analysis of our data in terms of these classes reveal? We begin with the distribution of origin and destination classes among respondents to the surveys (Table I). In this table, the class distributions of males and females are given separately in terms of their own employment, and in relation to that of their fathers when respondents were aged 15.[15]

It will be seen that, as might be expected, the marginal distributions are similar across the former nations. In the case of males, the proportion with class origins in the salariat is slightly higher in the West than the East (24 per cent as against 19), whereas the obverse is the case for those from skilled manual backgrounds (31 per cent and 34 per cent respectively). The latter pattern is also found among females. Among both sexes, and hardly surprisingly, somewhat higher proportions of West Germans have *petit-bourgeois* origins. Turning to class destinations, we see that the differences between the two countries are greater, although here too they can hardly be described as pronounced. The percentage of respondents found in salariat destinations is higher among men in the West but among women in the East – although this latter finding is probably due more to the fact that we cannot separate the upper and lower elements of this class (classes I and II) than to any real differences in the class distributions of women East and West. (Women in both countries would tend to be found in the lower rather than the upper salariat). Women are also much more likely than are men to be found in routine clerical work and in unskilled (rather than skilled) manual occupations. Comparing the origin and destination distributions within countries, we find the expected sectoral shifts in favour of non-manual employment among West German men, although there has been no obvious corresponding tendency for the proportion involved in manual work to diminish among their counterparts in the East. The percentage of farmers and smallholders (class IVc) has declined in East and West alike.

The overall correspondence between the marginal distributions is evident in the low cross-national dissimilarity indices (deltas) shown in the table. For example, if the deltas for the sexes are calculated pairwise across the countries, the resulting values of 7 and 13 (for male origin and destination distributions respectively) are among the lowest found in any earlier analogous pairwise comparison of industrial nations (see Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992: 193). Interestingly enough, the male/female deltas within each country are also close, at 32 for the FRG and 30 in the case of the GDR. In other words, the degree of class differentiation by sex is both remarkably similar, given the different socio-political regimes of the two countries; and, in the case of East Germany, perhaps surprisingly high (since previous surveys tend to show that the current class distributions of

TABLE I: *Distribution of respondents by class of origin and destination, and by sex (percentage by column); and delta (dissimilarity index) values for origin and destination distributions, FRG and GDR.*

(i) Class of origin (percentage by column)

	Males		Females	
	FRG	GDR	FRG	GDR
I, II	24	19	24	25
IIIa	8	7	11	9
IVa+b	11	9	14	8
IVc	10	12	9	10
V, VI	31	34	25	32
VIIa, IIIb	15	16	15	12
VIIb	2	2	2	5

(ii) Class of destination (percentage by column)

	Males		Females	
	FRG	GDR	FRG	GDR
I, II	37	31	30	34
IIIa	12	7	30	22
IVa+b	8	6	5	4
IVc	2	4	1	4
V, VI	28	37	7	9
VIIa, IIIb	13	14	27	24
VIIb	1	2	1	4

(iii) Deltas for origin and destination distributions, and pairwise comparison of nations

FRG: Origins and destinations	Males =	21
	Females =	37
GDR: Origins and destinations	Males =	14
	Females =	34
FRG compared to GDR: Origins	Males =	7
	Females =	12
Destinations	Males =	13
	Females =	12
Males compared to females:	FRG =	32
	GDR =	30

Note:

1. Percentages may not sum exactly because of rounding.
2. Classes are: salariat (I+II); routine clerical employees (IIIa); *petite bourgeoisie* (IVa+b); farmers and smallholders (IVc); skilled manual workers (V+VI); unskilled manual workers (VIIa+IIIb); agricultural workers (VIIb).

men and women are more similar in state-socialist societies than in those of the capitalist West). In this respect, at least, the GDR would seem to be rather more like the Federal Republic than like the other state-socialist

TABLE II: *Decomposition of total mobility rates (TMR) into total vertical (TV) and total non-vertical (TNV) mobility, and of total vertical mobility into total upward (TU) and total downward (TD) mobility, by sex, FRG and GDR*

	TMR	TV	TNV	TV/TNV	TU	TD	TU/TD
Males:							
FRG	63	50	13	3.8	34	16	2.1
GDR	70	56	14	4.0	37	19	1.9
Females:							
FRG	75	56	19	2.9	29	27	1.1
GDR	72	55	17	3.2	30	25	1.2

countries of Eastern Europe – and the degree of employment segregation by sex in the former West Germany was high even by the standards of capitalist societies (see Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992: 243).

Similarly, if we then calculate the observed mobility rates for each country (Table II), these too are markedly alike. In this table, we report total mobility rates (TMR), in turn divided into total vertical (TV) and total non-vertical (TNV) mobility. Vertical mobility is then partitioned further into total upward (TU) and total downward (TD) mobility.[16] Among males, the vertical to non-vertical ratio is a little higher in the GDR, although the ratio of upward to downward mobility is marginally greater in the Federal Republic. In the case of women both ratios are somewhat higher for the East. But, in all cases, one is again talking here about slight differences in an overall pattern of results which is similar across the two former nation-states.

Turning now to the models, one obvious issue can be clarified at the outset, if we compare the relative mobility chances among men and women under the different socio-political regimes. We can see, by returning to Table I, that there are some differences between the sexes, in both countries, where individuals are treated in terms of their own employment experiences. In particular, women are more likely than are men to be found in routine clerical employment, and less likely to obtain skilled manual jobs. In other words, women's class destinations differ from those of men, because of widely-recognized processes yielding sex-segregation in labour markets.

How do these processes affect relative class mobility chances? The evidence shown in Table III suggests that they do not. Here I fit three models to the data for class social mobility and sex. In both countries the independence model (OS + DS) provides a poor fit to the data. Men and women may be distributed to different class destinations but this does not exhaust the relationships in our mobility tables. In fact a model of common social fluidity (CmSF) provides an adequate fit to the data for both parts of Germany. This model allows for the associations in the independence model but posits a further association between a person's class of origin and his or her class destination (OD). That association is itself invariant

TABLE III: *Results of testing the model of common social fluidity against data on intergenerational mobility for the sexes (women's class determined by reference to own employment), FRG and GDR*

	Model	G^2	df	p	rG^2	delta	beta
FRG	Independence	329.36	72	0.000	–	17.88	
	CmSF	26.33	36	0.881	92.0	4.68	
	UNIDIFF	26.16	35	0.860	92.1	4.65	ns
GDR	Independence	152.49	72	0.000	–	13.56	
	CmSF	33.49	36	0.589	78.0	5.98	
	UNIDIFF	33.49	35	0.541	78.0	5.97	ns

Note:

1. Class origin (O) and class destination (D) each have seven levels (see Table I).
2. S = sex.
3. Independence model = OS+DS.
4. Common social fluidity model = OS+DS+OD.
5. G^2 = log likelihood ratio; rG^2 = percentage reduction in G^2 achieved (treating the conditional independence model as a baseline); delta = proportion of misclassified cases.
6. beta = UNIDIFF parameter estimate; males set at zero; ns = not significant.

across the sexes. The interaction between a person's class origins, destinations, and sex (the ODS term in the model) is not significant and therefore not required to obtain a satisfactory fit to the data.

Of course, the common social fluidity model offers only a global or generalized test of underlying relative rates, so that small but sociologically interesting specific differences in mobility chances can easily be overlooked. A more powerful means of assessing whether or not social fluidity differs across the sexes is provided by the so-called uniform difference (or UNIDIFF) model developed during the CASMIN study. This has an added advantage over the standard loglinear approach in that the UNIDIFF test addresses the further issue of whether or not two sets of odds ratios display a monotonic trend in one particular direction. More specifically, it allows for the possibility that the different sets of odds ratios relating to competing pairs of class origins and destinations move uniformly (though not by a constant amount) either towards or away from unity, in one mobility table as compared to another.[17]

However, as will be seen from the results shown in the table, the UNIDIFF model does not improve significantly upon the fit obtained by the model of common social fluidity – scarcely reducing the deviance (in the case of the GDR not at all) for the sacrifice of the additional degree of freedom. Application of this more stringent test does not therefore lead us to qualify our conclusion that relative class mobility chances are the same for each sex within the two countries. In substantive terms, this means that the pattern of relative mobility rates (or social fluidity) underlying women's intergenerational mobility is similar to that which characterizes men's mobility, so that the same set of class-linked inequalities is evident among males and females alike. This proposition holds true in both parts of

formerly-divided Germany. In other words, while the raw mobility data confirm that the position of women within the class structure is different from that of men, these differences in absolute rates are almost entirely attributable to differences in the marginal (destination) distributions in the tables. That is, *sex* segregation in the occupational structure means that men and women are likely to end up in different destinations, but *class* inequalities scarcely vary by sex. The forces that shape the association between origins and destinations among men would seem to be sex blind – operating in much the same way among women.

These results neatly confirm Christel Lane's argument (1983: 490, 501) that, in the GDR, great progress was made towards providing women with 'the preconditions to make them equal to men in the labour market' – although perhaps not in the way she intended this claim to be taken. Lane may be correct (though I suspect not) when she suggests that *sexual* equality had advanced further in East Germany than in the more progressive capitalist societies, in the sense that females were not as widely discriminated against in terms of educational opportunities, were more likely to receive equal pay for equal work, and in general terms benefitted from a centralized political system which 'made possible the relatively fast and rational redistribution of resources in favour of women'. But it is also true that, under communism, women in the GDR appear to have been treated equally alongside men in the sense that, and to the extent that, the degree of *class* inequality in mobility chances was as pronounced among females as it was among males. If East German women were liberated then they were free only to share in same class-related inequalities of opportunity as were to be found among their male partners.[18]

The next question follows logically from the last. If relative mobility chances are the same for males and females within the two countries how then do they compare in cross-national perspective? An appropriate way of exploring this issue is to fit a model of common social fluidity to each pair of mobility tables for the sexes. The results are shown in Table IV. Here one is testing the hypotheses that relative mobility rates are the same among men in the GDR and FRG and, likewise, the same among women.

In these tests, the independence model posits only an association between the distribution of class origins and each of the two nations (ON), and between the distribution of class destinations and nations (DN). In other words the marginal distributions are allowed to vary across the countries. This model, as expected, fits badly for both sexes. However, and again for both sexes, a model of common social fluidity provides an acceptable fit to the data. In the case of males for example, this model returns a G^2 of 48 on 36 degrees of freedom, and misclassifies almost seven per cent of cases ($p = 0.084$). Among females fewer than 6 per cent of individuals are wrongly classified by the model ($p = 0.593$). These figures represent improvements of some 82 per cent (for men) and 85 per cent (for women) on the simpler independence model. In other words, relative mobility chances were broadly similar in both parts of Germany, such that

TABLE IV: *Results of testing the model of common social fluidity in the FRG and GDR, by sex (respondent's class determined by reference to own employment)*

Model	G^2	df	p	rG^2	delta	beta
Males:						
Independence	261.02	72	0.000	–	16.39	
CmSF	48.18	36	0.084	81.5	6.80	
UNIDIFF	34.54	35	0.490	86.8	5.30	–0.7040
Females:						
Independence	220.83	72	0.000	–	16.02	
CmSF	33.40	36	0.593	84.9	5.85	
UNIDIFF	26.55	35	0.847	88.0	5.33	–0.5408

Note:

1. Class origin (O) and class destination (D) each have seven levels (see Table I).
2. Nations (N) are FRG and GDR.
3. Independence model = ON+DN.
4. Common social fluidity model = ON+DN+OD.
5. G^2 = log likelihood ratio; rG^2 = percentage reduction in G^2 achieved (treating the conditional independence model as a baseline); delta = proportion of misclassified cases.
6. beta = UNIDIFF parameter estimate; FRG set at zero.

by far the largest part of the association between social background and class destinations in the two societies was common to both.

However, mobility chances were not literally identical in the East and West, since (as will be seen from the table) the uniform difference parameter offers a significant improvement on the more general model of common social fluidity. Here, at last, we find some indication that communism enhanced equality of opportunities for mobility. The UNIDIFF parameter estimate is not only significant but negative, indicating a decrease in the odds ratios for the GDR compared to those for the FRG, and therefore a somewhat increased level of overall social fluidity in the East. It is important not to exaggerate this effect. More than four-fifths of the association between origins and destinations in each society was common to both. Nevertheless, by applying the fairly searching test of the uniform difference model, it is just about possible to sustain the argument that the political regime of the Democratic Republic did after all secure systematically but *marginally* greater equality of opportunity among men and women than did the democratic regime immediately to the West.

IV

This is probably as far as the analysis can be pushed using these data. A more sophisticated treatment would require larger samples.

I have, for example, attempted to fit the CASMIN 'core model' to the male mobility data for the GDR. This is a topological model that seeks to capture a series of specific effects that are exerted on the pattern of relative rates.

Rather than postulate common social fluidity, Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992: chapters 4 and 5) proposed a model embracing four effects that are predicted from sociological theory; namely, those of hierarchy, inheritance, sector and affinity. Unfortunately the GDR sample from the ISJP is simply too small to permit reliable analysis in these terms. The model returns a $G^2(S)$ – a log likelihood ratio statistic standardized on the size of the smallest sample in the CASMIN study – of 45.7 (the critical value of this measure is 40), delta = 7.8, p = 0.29. Only two of the eight parameter estimates for the effects in the model reach statistical significance; namely, those which relate to the generally increased propensity for individuals to be found in their class of origin rather than any other (*in1*), and a sectoral effect (*se*) that captures the enhanced probability of movements of an intrasectoral as against an intersectoral kind (especially in relation to the distinction between agricultural and non-agricultural class positions). However, all but two of the parameters estimated for the GDR are of the same sign as the cross-nationally common parameters in the model, the exceptions being those for the *hi2* and *in2* terms. These anticipate respectively that long-range vertical mobility will be especially low, and that there will be a distinctively high degree of immobility within classes IVa + IVb (the *petite bourgeoisie*), IVc (farmers and small holders), and I + II (the salariat).

If the data for the GDR and FRG are pooled, in effect creating a data-set for a unified Germany, the national variant of the CASMIN core model proposed by Erikson and Goldthorpe for the FRG provides an improved but still inadequate fit (G^2S is now 44, delta = 4.1, p = 0.11); all of the parameter estimates have the signs expected under the model; and three further effects reach or come close to the level of statistical significance. These are the *in2* and *hi2* terms themselves (which are now signed positively and negatively respectively, as in the CASMIN core model), and the *af1* term (which describes a disaffinity between the salariat and the class of agricultural workers). Only the *hi1*, *in3*, and *af2* terms fail to reach levels of statistical significance; that is, those effects proposing respectively a reduced probability of social mobility (*ceteris paribus*) where intergenerational crossing of lines of hierarchical division is involved; an especially high propensity towards father-son succession in farming; and a series of affinities that derive from specific continuities between classes (specifically the salariat and routine clerical classes, the two agricultural classes, and those where there is the greatest possibility of transferring capital between generations). The actual estimates are as follows: *hi1* = ns; *hi2* = –0.42; *in1* = 0.32; *in2* = 1.25; *in3* = ns; *se* = –1.1; *af1* = –0.39; *af2* = ns (compare Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992: 147).

This can be taken only as weak evidence which does no more than hint that, not only was the overall degree of social fluidity the same in both societies, but the pattern of relative mobility chances might also have been similar. Set in this context the CmSF models must appear crude. Nevertheless, despite the relatively small numbers, there is no reason to believe that the principal findings here reported are unreliable.

TABLE V: *Results of testing the model of common social fluidity in the FRG and GDR, by sex (respondent's class determined by reference to own employment), with social class collapsed to three levels*

Model	G^2	df	p	rG^2	delta	beta
Males:						
Independence	90.95	8	0.000	–	12.16	
CmSF	9.49	4	0.050	89.6	3.55	
UNIDIFF	1.16	3	0.767	98.7	1.33	–0.6787
Females:						
Independence	78.80	8	0.000	–	11.32	
CmSF	5.58	4	0.231	92.9	2.89	
UNIDIFF	3.37	3	0.338	95.7	2.45	ns

Note:

1. Class origin and class destination each have three levels: salariat (I+II), intermediate (III, IV, V), and working (VI, VII). Details otherwise are as in Table IV.

For example, anyone worried about sparseness in the tables may be reassured to learn that we can collapse the class categories from seven to three, but this makes no substantive difference to the outcome. The same basic pattern reappears in the results (see Table V). That is to say, a common social fluidity model fits adequately for both sexes, and the uniform difference model then offers an improved fit – but one which is now statistically significant for males only (since the simpler CmSF model fits so well among females). In other words, the mobility regimes in both parts of Germany for both sexes were largely common, although – according to the more sensitive criterion of the UNIDIFF model – there is some evidence of systematic but only slightly greater equality of opportunity (especially among men) in the East.

Similarly, if attention is concentrated on those individuals who were born after the end of the Second World War, we again find essentially common social fluidity across the two socio-political regimes (Table VI). These are the respondents whose whole experience was exclusively of one system or the other, and yet it is hard to find evidence that the Honecker generation benefited from greater equality of opportunity than did those who lived through the West German 'economic miracle', despite the declared communist policy of dismantling class barriers and extending opportunities for talented individuals from less privileged backgrounds. Indeed, the marginally increased fluidity earlier detected in East Germany (by the UNIDIFF model) is largely invisible among those born in the GDR during the communist period, although this is probably because the common social fluidity models for males and females fit so well – itself, perhaps, something of an artefact of the reduced numbers in the analysis (569 males and 596 females distributed across 18 cells in each model).

It is possible, by looking at the residuals, to see where the data deviate most from the CmSF model. In the case of West German males, the model

TABLE VI: *Results of testing the model of common social fluidity in the FRG and GDR, by sex (respondent's class determined by reference to own employment), with social class collapsed to three levels (salariat, intermediate, working), among respondents born in 1946 or later*

Model	G^2	df	p	rG^2	delta	beta
Males:						
Independence	30.63	8	0.000	–	9.84	
CmSF	1.35	4	0.855	95.6	1.96	
UNIDIFF	0.42	3	0.933	98.6	0.89	ns
Females:						
Independence	32.07	8	0.000	–	9.30	
CmSF	1.76	4	0.783	94.5	2.23	
UNIDIFF	1.75	3	0.629	94.5	2.24	ns

Note: Details as in Table IV.

of common social fluidity fitted in Table IV underestimates the numbers intergenerationally stable in the salariat (observed 108, expected 98), but overestimates those who will be downwardly mobile from the salariat to the skilled working class (observed 27, expected 33). Other residuals are smaller and show no obvious pattern. In the case of East Germany, intergenerational stability in the salariat is overestimated, whereas the obverse is the case in relation to downward mobility from the salariat to the skilled working class (observed 29 and 28, expected 39 and 21, respectively). Other discrepancies are smaller and again lack a general pattern.

In short, our analysis of the data from the ISJP suggests that the overall pattern of association between class origins and class destinations was similar in both parts of formerly-divided Germany; and, furthermore, to the limited extent that this was not the case, then the discrepancy lay mainly in the fact that the propensity for long-range mobility was marginally greater under state socialism than under democratic capitalism. This is hardly surprising, given the intervention in higher education practised by socialist states, specifically the policy of sponsoring and promoting children from working-class and agricultural backgrounds, despite their relative failure in the competition for university places. But what is surely striking in all of this is that, despite its declared policy of facilitating long-range mobility into the salariat by opening up higher education to the sons and daughters of workers, the communist regime in East Germany made so little impact on the basic structure of unequal relative mobility chances between the various classes. Inequalities of opportunity were, despite half a century of determined communism, in effect diminished only at the margins.

V

This paper started from the premise, concisely stated by Wesolowski and Mach (1986: 20–1), that 'individual and collective mobility, both as social

benefaction and as a correlate of economic necessity, is part of the ideology of state socialism'. 'To read the newspapers', they observe,

> is enough to realize that the problem of mobility is really important in Eastern European countries. Their communist parties consider social promotion, both for individuals and for groups, as one of the bigger blessings brought about by the new regime. The possibility of moving from the peasantry to the working class and from either of these to the highly qualified professions of the intelligentsia is ideologically construed as a way of evening out historical wrongs.

The evidence bearing upon collective mobility – equality of outcome – is a matter of unresolved debate about which I have not ventured an opinion. However, if the above analysis of social fluidity is sound, then the most that can be claimed on behalf of state socialism in East Germany is that it promoted a marginal increase in equality of opportunity. Relative mobility chances for individuals in the former GDR were in fact basically the same as those to be found in capitalist West Germany.[19]

At this point I am reminded of Ferge's remarks (1979: 30) about the gap between rhetoric and reality under actually existing socialism. 'It can happen', she observes,

> that while the political declarations or the social policy decisions of a country are expressly committed to a social change and to the reduction of inequalities, the *ex post facto* statistical and sociological analysis of facts shows a different tendency, with no change or even an increase in inequalities. Thus one must draw one's conclusions about the real balance of power and the interests served by it from these facts.

My own conclusions about the facts of social mobility chances in the two Germanies are, I hope, evident enough. By way of closing remarks however, it is interesting to consider the views of German respondents themselves, specifically with respect to these same issues of equality, opportunity and rewards. They provide an interesting coda to Ferge's declaration in favour of sociology as against ideology.

Consider, for example, the proportions in each country who agreed or disagreed with the various statements shown in Table VII. Again the data are taken from the ISJP surveys. The columns in the table report the percentage of those interviewed in the FRG and GDR who agreed with each item, minus the percentage who disagreed, together with the resulting difference between the two nations.[20] It is clear from the first item that neither set of interviewees was much inclined to support equality of outcome in the distribution of income and wealth. The pattern of responses to the next four items suggests that, by contrast, a substantial majority in both countries were in favour of equality of opportunity, and of a competition with unequal outcomes, so long as rewards were proportional to merit. Thus, as the last of these items demonstrates, differences in skill and intelligence were not commonly attributed to luck but seen instead as

TABLE VII: *Support for distribution principles, and perceptions of inequality, FRG and GDR (%)*

	FRG	GDR	Difference
The fairest way of distributing wealth and income would be to give everyone equal shares	–37	–42	5
It's only fair if people have more money or wealth, but only if there are equal opportunities.	72	70	2
People are entitled to keep what they have earned – even if this means some people will be wealthier than others.	83	91	8
People who work hard deserve to earn more than those who do not.	89	96	7
It is just luck if some people are more intelligent or skilful than others, so they don't deserve to earn more money	–27	–35	8
In (COUNTRY) people have equal opportunities to get ahead.	21	–35	56
In (COUNTRY) people get rewarded for their efforts	56	1	55
In (COUNTRY) people get rewarded for their intelligence and skills.	66	27	39
Do you think you are paid much less than you deserve, somewhat less than you deserve, about what you deserve, somewhat more than you deserve, or much more than you deserve?	45	80	35*

Note:
* percentages are of those who felt they were paid less than they deserved minus those who felt they were paid more.

talents deserving of differential reward. In sum, the degree of support for broadly meritocratic principles of reward applied to a competition in which all have equal chances to win is similar among East Germans and West Germans alike, as the final column in the table makes clear.

However, when we turn from the realm of moral principles to that of beliefs about the extent to which the existing distribution of rewards is in accordance with those principles, the differences between the two countries become pronounced. Respondents in the East, on being invited to comment upon life in the former GDR, were markedly more likely to describe a society in which people did not have equal opportunities to get ahead, were not rewarded for their efforts or talents, and therefore earned much less than they deserved, than were respondents in the West when asked to make the same assessments in relation to the former Federal Republic. East Germans perceived their society as one in which chances for advancement were unequal and the ensuing rewards for success unjustly distributed because undeserved. In other words, it is people's perceptions of what is the case that are here cross-nationally divergent, rather than their

conceptions of what constitutes social justice. The East German ideology of meritocratic socialism seems to have reinforced popular support for broadly meritocratic principles, as applied to a competition in which all have equal opportunities, and so created expectations which were at odds with the reality of everyday life in the GDR itself.

It is not difficult to imagine why the popularly perceived gap between principle and practice became so pronounced. Meritocratic aspirations will have been raised to an unrealistic level by the rhetoric of enhanced social fluidity under communism. Meritocratic principles were openly flouted in the policies announcing positive discrimination on behalf of workers and peasants. There was also widespread public awareness of the covert and overt discrimination that was practised in favour of men, productive workers, and members of the Party. Be that as it may, it seems that in the context of state socialism, the perceived failure of the East German authorities to deliver on their promise of creating an open society will have exacerbated the already considerable problems of regime legitimation, since it was the state itself that took responsibility for distributive outcomes and for effecting social change.

This conclusion is implicit in Wesolowski and Mach's commentary (1986: 25) on the functions of social mobility under state socialism. 'In socialist systems', they observe, 'state intervention takes the form of reorganizing social life'. Furthermore,

> since the state authorities in 'reorganizing society' intervene strongly in all macro-structures, the problem of legitimation becomes global as a result. The authorities which feel qualified to recreate reality are perceived by the population as responsible for everything . . . In revolutionary systems, which initially derived their legitimacy, at least in part, from promising extensive social change, the issue of maintaining and of widening the legitimacy resting on such foundations is crucial.

The meritocratic aspirations of West Germans, and their perception of the Federal Republic as a society in which people in broad terms did obtain their due deserts, are characteristic of those found in most advanced capitalist societies.[21] In these societies, the popular belief that inequality results from equal opportunities and reflects meritocratic reward serves to legitimate market outcomes, since success and failure are routinely attributed to individual talents and effort (or their absence).[22]

However, in the GDR, the potential for legitimation inherent in meritocratic beliefs was undermined by the supreme power claimed by (and attributed to) the state. East Germans seem to have endorsed meritocratic principles as strongly as West Germans (the ideology of meritocratic socialism serving to reinforce these aspirations); but, at the same time, also held expectations about the role of government (and its responsibility for delivering on policy promises) which were consistent with living in a centrally-planned society. When these expectations were not fulfilled (at least

with regard to equality of opportunity) then the state became the obvious culprit.[23]

It seems to me that the German experience underlines the importance of David Lockwood's observations about the necessity of taking into account the *content* of people's beliefs in prospective explanations of social integration. In *Solidarity and Schism* (Lockwood 1992: 22, 41, 134–35, 156, 298–99, 310), David points out that Durkheimians and Marxists alike have tended to ignore the variability of belief-systems, and to assume instead their formal equivalence from the point of view of accounting for social solidarity. In other words, for many theorists of social order, one set of overarching values and norms has been as good as any other. All have been given the same role in explanations of social cohesion. However, some belief-systems are simply more conductive to social order than are others, and the point about meritocratic beliefs in general, and the notion of equality of opportunity in particular, is that (as David also notes) these individualize the causes of success and failure. By claiming all responsibility for distributive outcomes in the name of socialism, the East German authorities effectively denied that possibility, and ensured instead that these causes were identified within the state itself.

If I may finish on a speculative note, one might argue therefore that these findings about attitudes to social justice help explain why the GDR collapsed quite so quickly, after it became clear that the Soviets would not intervene militarily to support the communists. The East German ruling elite, having attempted to legitimate their regime in broadly meritocratic terms (as being consistent with equality of opportunity), failed to satisfy the popular expectations for social mobility that were generated by their own political rhetoric. The GDR was perceived by its citizens to be a grossly unmeritocratic social order. For this reason, popular discontent could easily be focused upon the central authorities, rather than internalized by attributing failure to individual responsibility – especially since the state claimed for itself such an extensive role in the ordering of distributive outcomes. Of course, the legitimation deficit suffered by the former GDR had many and more obvious sources than the failure of the central authorities to change the public perception of relative mobility chances, most notably perhaps in the West German television channels that were available each evening to some 85 per cent of East German residents. I would not wish to exaggerate the significance of social mobility (or immobility) in any account of the collapse of real socialism.[24] Still, if my argument is sound, then it does not tend to confirm the wisdom of David Lockwood's advice to take seriously both the content of belief systems and the methodology of comparative analysis.

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POSTSCRIPT

While this article was in press the researchers involved in the East German Life History Study (Max Planck Institute for Human Development and Education, Berlin) also published some reports on social mobility in the GDR (see Huinink and Solga 1994; Mayer and Solga 1994; Solga 1995). Comparison of our findings involves the usual problems deriving from the use of somewhat different statistical techniques and class schemes. Nevertheless, their results are consistent with my own, and confirm that the picture, painted by the SED, of East Germany as an 'open society' was (to paraphrase their conclusion) 'more myth than reality' – since overall social fluidity in the GDR was no greater than in the FRG and probably declined over time. (The key findings are reported in Solga 1995: Table 8 and Mayer and Solga 1994: Tables 2 and 3).

NOTES

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1. Kohn's (1989: 20–24) fourfold classification of types of comparative research is described in his edited collection of essays on cross-national research in sociology. On the post-war similarities between the economic and social structures of (what were to become) the FRG and GDR see Mellor (1978).

2. It seems unlikely that this complex question will have a simple answer. After reviewing the evidence, I am inclined to agree with the authors of one study who concluded that 'in sum it appears a valid generalization that, if private ownership of the means of production is replaced by collective ownership, some types of inequality are eliminated, some others remain, and some new sorts of inequalities emerge in social life' (Kolosi and Wnuk-Lipiński 1983: 3). The evidence relating to the Soviet Union is reviewed in Lane (1982: chapter 3). That for socialist East-Central Europe more generally is reported in Kende and Strmiska (1987). On Cuba see the essays collected in Mesa-Lago (1971). The Chinese experience is summarized by Parish (1981). On the GDR see Richard Hauser et al. (1994).

3. On this issue critical Marxists tend to share in the view of the orthodoxy. See, for example, Zsuzsa Ferge (1979: 40–1).

4. This interpretation of Marx's theory of justice is stated concisely in Elster (1985: 229–30). Later Marxist thinking on the issue of social justice is summarized in Lukes (1985: chapter 4). For overviews of the wider literature see Cohen (1986) and Scherer (1992). According to many observers, the distributive inequalities of condition found under real socialism were the result not only of rewarding 'each according to his work', but also of giving unequal rewards for equal work. For example, Wlodzimierz Wesolowski (1988: 3–7) has argued that because of the widespread tendency to discriminate against women, and to favour members of the Party in general and workers in so-called productive sectors of the economy in particular, under state socialism the 'gender, sector and nomenklatura principles undermine the

model assumption of equal pay for equal work'.

5. Rogovin (1989: 137) summarizes the official view in these terms: 'The concepts of social justice and social equality are not identical . . . equality in, say, material status of members of society may be unjust, especially when it is due to wage equalization although the respective work done may be unequal in quality and quantity. The principal form of a just distribution in the position of individuals and social groups under socialism is a differentiation based on the consistent observation of the principle of distribution according to work performed'.

6. See also Meier (1989: 169–70) who notes 'The educational system in all socialist societies has to fulfill at least two universal functions: to provide as much social equality . . . as seems necessary for the stability and legitimation of the socialist order, and to produce an educated labour force . . . both a pool of highly trained and selected talents and a specialized, educated "normal" labour force . . . Educational systems in both the Soviet Union and the GDR have experienced situations in which the egalitarian principle of guaranteeing equal educational rights and chances to students from all classes and strata in practice came into conflict with the meritocratic principle by which recruitment for the different trades and professions is managed. The twofold universal use of education periodically creates tensions that hardly can be ignored. Educational planning from above tries to orchestrate the conflicting purposes in such situations by giving priority to one or the other goal and reversing the rank order of functions from time to time'.

7. Wesolowski (1988: 17) later argued explicitly that *both* 'the reduction of social differences' and 'processes of intergenerational mobility' should be taken as 'indicators and elements of socialist changes' in any study of stratification under real socialism. Ferge (1979: 42–4, 305–6) makes the same point in almost the same words.

8. David Lane (1976: 178) has rightly noted that the Soviet ideology of meritocracy also embodied strong functionalist overtones. Wesolowski's (1988: 11–12) own restatement of the normative theory of stratification under socialism is a good example of how the meritocratic and functionalist defences of inequality became intertwined. In his account, socialism 'is based on the assumption that the division of labour is an inseparable feature of every modern society and that this is linked with two of its correlates: the unequal distribution of power and the unequal distribution of material goods. The division of labour manifests itself, among other things, in a multiplicity of specific jobs, some of which require greater qualifications, or expert knowledge, and others – lesser qualifications . . . One may say that jobs which differ as regards qualifications and knowledge give unequal inputs to the well-being of society. Likewise, the differentiation between managerial and non-managerial positions gives unequal inputs to the progress and welfare of society as a whole. The principle of socialist justice calls for higher remuneration of both jobs with higher qualifications and positions of power. In this model not only the actual results of different jobs and actions are taken into consideration. But also the effort made to become better qualified likewise counts . . . Jobs and functions that require greater preparations should be more highly evaluated . . . In this way the model postulates: (1) that there are "more valuable" jobs and functions; (2) that these deserve higher rewards'.

9. This was of course not the only alleged difference between classes in the West and stratification under real socialism. An earlier (now unfashionable) argument was that status crystallization (the correlation between education, occupation, income, housing conditions and such like) was lower under state socialism than democratic capitalism (see Alestalo et al. 1980). The Soviet literature also offers extensive discussion about such issues as cross-class co-operation, intra-class differentiation or fractions, and the relationship with the Party. These are not germane to the issue of social justice and need not be considered here. A good summary of the official theories of class under state

socialism will be found in Matthews (1972). The more recent views of critical socialists are outlined in Bõröcz (1989).

10. See also Hegedüs (1977: 59, 71) and Charvát et al. (1978: 162) who offer the same argument in almost the same terms. Reviewing this field a decade or so later, Wesolowski and Mach (1986: 27) observed that, in real socialist societies, 'those in power appear to have adopted a convenient stance. According to them, so much has been done to equalize opportunities and the process of levelling the social position of classes is proceeding so rapidly that there is no need to query how the equality of opportunities should be implemented in practice. To a certain extent thought has leapt into a world better than the one which has been created in reality. However, questions about the degree to which opportunities have been made equal cannot be avoided.'

11. Connor (1979) cites mobility data from the 1960s and early 1970s for Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia, in his study of stratification in Eastern Europe. Strmiska's (1987) analysis relies largely on the same surveys. Ganzeboom and his colleagues (1989) compiled 149 intergenerational class mobility tables from 35 countries, but were able to include data for only a few state socialist societies, again excluding the German Democratic Republic. The CASMIN (Comparative Analysis of Social Mobility in Industrial Nations) Project, led by Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992), reports reliable data from the mid 1970s, but only for Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia, among the formerly communist states. A few studies of *intra*generational mobility in the GDR were published (for example Braunreuther 1966) – although, for ideological reasons, career mobility (or 'fluctuation') was examined mostly in terms of movement between types of economic enterprise.

12. Invariably, studies which purport to analyse equality of opportunity in East Germany focus only upon the narrower question of equality in *educational* opportunities, in the restricted sense of class differentials in access to (usually higher) education – data on educational participation rates being, by comparison with those on intergenerational class mobility, more readily available. See, for example, Williamson (1979) and Glaessner (1984).

13. Compare, for example, the different assessments of intergenerational mobility in Soviet-type societies offered by Strmiska (1987) and Teckenberg (1990). These authors differ mainly in their interpretation of the evidence concerning social fluidity. Some earlier researchers fail to make the fundamental distinction between absolute mobility rates and relative mobility chances. See, for example, the analysis of Czechoslovakian mobility offered in Charvát et al. (1978) and the study of Estonia by Kenkman et al. (1986).

14. For full details of this project see Kluegel et al. (1995).

15. Some might argue that, in countries where women have had high employment rates for a considerable time (such as the former GDR), the use of fathers' occupations to indicate origin classes should be seen as problematic. However, occupational information on mothers was not collected by the ISJP researchers, so we have no alternative here but to follow the practice of earlier mobility studies.

16. The Goldthorpe class scheme is of course not unidimensionally hierarchical. On the distinction between vertical and non-vertical mobility in this context see Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992: 195). The results shown in Table II are based on the hierarchical effects matrix provided by Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992: 124).

17. For a specification of the model see Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992: 90–2). The same test appears also to have been developed independently by Xie (1992) who refers to it as the 'log-multiplicative layer effect model'.

18. I do not share Lane's optimism about the degree to which equality between the sexes was established in East Germany for reasons that are made clear by Helga Michalsky (1984: 262), who concludes her review of the evidence with the observation that most policies of sexual equality in the GDR 'remained almost entirely at the stage of declamatory principles', leaving 'traditional

behaviour patterns in both sexes [which] mean that even in education the old cliches on the different roles of the sexes are handed on'. See also Sørensen and Trappe (1995).

19. Although I have maintained the distinction between equality of outcome and equality of opportunity for the heuristic purposes of this paper, I would also argue that in practice, unequal outcomes have implications for equality of opportunity. As Parkin (1971: 13–14) puts it, 'Although the processes of rewarding and recruitment are analytically separable they are closely intertwined in the actual operation of the stratification system. This is to a large extent to do with the prominent part played by the family in "placing" individuals at various points in the class hierarchy. There is a marked tendency for those who occupy relatively privileged positions to ensure that their own progeny are recruited into similar positions'. The same point is made in different ways by Wesolowski and Mach (1986: 30), Kolosi and Wnuk-Lipiński (1983: 144), and Ferge (1979: 154).

20. Responses to the questions were precoded, typically on a five-point Likert scale, ranging from strongly agree and agree through a neutral category to disagree and strongly disagree.

21. The best overview of what is now a substantial field of empirical research into public perceptions of distributive justice will be found in Miller (1992).

22. See, for example, Friedrich Hayek (1976: 64, 74), who notes that although one cannot justify market outcomes as reflecting desert (since luck plays too large a role in determining who gets what), nevertheless the solidarity of market societies depends to an important degree on the erroneous popular belief that market outcomes do in fact reward merit. Hayek judges such a belief to be necessary if people are to tolerate the inequality that the market produces.

23. This interpretation of East German popular culture is consistent with the findings reported by Edeltraud Roller (1994: 115), who concludes from survey evidence gathered in late 1990 that 'East Germans supported the achievement principle of the market economy to the same degree as the West Germans. At the same time, they harboured higher expectations regarding the role of government, expectations that are more congruent with a planned economy . . .'.

24. Interestingly enough, however, Koralewicz-Zebik (1984: 225) has made exactly the same argument in relation to Poland. She maintains the evidence suggests that 'changes in the perception of inequalities in Poland . . . show that . . . greatest frustration was due to a decomposition of the system of meritocratic justice, accepted by the majority of Poles, combined with the expansion of other, unaccepted, criteria for rewards. Thus the growth of increasing inequalities was accompanied by a total withdrawal of the legitimization of inequalities'. For an overview of East German legitimation problems see Stent (1986).

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