

# **LEFTISM**

**From de Sade and Marx  
to Hitler and Marcuse**

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 **ARLINGTON HOUSE·PUBLISHERS**  
**NEW ROCHELLE, NEW YORK**

## Chapter 18

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### Anticolonialism

Anticolonialism has been one of the worst traps into which American foreign policy fell during this century. Naturally its stalwarts were and are the leftists. Yet the anticolonial sentiment is quite generally represented in the American people and, in the United States, one has to be something of an *esprit fort*, an emancipated spirit, to be able to resist its temptation. The fact that anticolonialism has two distinct roots, and not just one, contributes powerfully to its strength. To make matters even worse, it has become a tactical weapon in the Cold War where Washington uses it with the greatest sincerity. Now, since anti-imperialism seems to sound better than anticolonialism it has partly but not entirely replaced the latter term in Soviet harangues. When I was asked in Irkutsk a few years ago what I thought about Eastern Siberia, I replied that it is a wonderful example of the dynamics of Russian colonialism. With this remark I horrified most of my interlocutors (by no means all convinced Communists) and one of them told me that the term colonialism was out of place here: I should have called it *osvoyeniye*, which means “incorporation” (or the German *Landnahme*), whereupon I opened my notebook and took down this valuable piece of information and education with the straightest of faces—whereupon a few in my audience started to laugh. I am sure, however, that some of the young among those present became aware for the first time in their lives that their country truly was a colonial power.

I witnessed something similar in America, when I once started a lecture with the remark that I, belonging to a nation which never had colonies, was addressing myself to the citizens of a colonial power. It was immediately pointed out to me that the United States never possessed colonies in the past and none at the present. When I mentioned the Philippine Islands, Guam, and Western Samoa, I created a minor sensation. The fact had been known all along, but its realization had been blocked. When I defined a colony in the modern sense as a distant area administrated by a motherland granting either only limited or even no autonomous power, we had to include some other areas as well.

There is, of course, nothing evil and nothing extraordinary about colonialism. It is the inevitable result of a historical law according to which not only nature, but also political geography, does not tolerate a vacuum. Where no effective resistance can be expected, other powers, other nations, other tribes will occupy, dominate, and administer an area. Our history could not be imagined without the forces of colonialism constantly at work. Without Greek colonialism Magna Graecia would not have existed, Stagira would not have existed (in a way Aristotle would not have existed), Paestum or Pergamum, Ephesus, or Agrigent would not delight us with their ruins. Without Phoenician colonialism, there would have been no Carthage—and eventually no St. Augustine. Roman colonialism (or “imperialism”) is responsible for the French language, for Racine and Molière—and also for Cervantes, Lope de Vega, and Calderón. Without Bavarian colonialism there would be no Austrian people. And so forth. As we should all realize, there is good colonialism and bad colonialism, just as we have good rule, which is government conscious of the common good and the welfare of the citizen or subjects, and bad rule which is selfish and exercised solely for the profit of the rulers.

The twin roots of American anticolonialism are (a) insistence on self-rule (democracy), and (b) a misinterpretation and an illegitimate application of the reasons for American independence. We have dealt elsewhere with the mirage of self-rule, which admits at best to a collective, but never to a personal-existential interpretation. The only individuals who enjoy self-rule are citizens in a direct democracy, deciding all issues with unanimity (a purely theoretical case) and absolute monarchs, dictators, or tyrants. The dream of everybody becoming his own monarch could especially be fulfilled by the anarchists (provided such fulfillment is possible and desirable), but the democrats can explain their system as a pantocracy only with the help of amazing abstractions, psychological arguments, and axiomatic suppositions which hardly fool the independent thinker.

Yet more often than not it is the memory of history classes and the uncritical listening to Fourth of July speeches rather than the democratic argument which emotionally dominates American anticolonialism. As a result a genuine fusion of leftist and “patriotic” arguments against colonialism is possible, and this is usually fostered assiduously by the more clever leaders of the American left. Here we have an ideal opportunity to quote again Dr. Johnson’s “Patriotism is the last refuge of the scoundrel.”

What is usually forgotten in the “patriotic” (i.e., historic) appeal to anticolonialism is, first of all, the fact that here we are not facing any “ism” whatever. The term “colonialism” will hardly be found in authoritative dictionaries before 1914 or even 1924. Colonizing is not the result of a systematic ideology, of a *Weltanschauung*, of a philosophy, political or other. A second fact has to do with the great variety of situations actually covered by the term “colony.” There have been and there still exist a few colonies which before the arrival of the white man were totally void of the human element. This is true, for instance, of a number of islands in the Indian Ocean. Is it an iniquitous situation if such settlements are governed by the motherland? When does their God-given right of secession and independence begin? Certainly not with the landing of the first settler. When are they “ripe” for autonomy? All answers of necessity will be arbitrary.

We have to place into the same category areas which were practically deserted and where the indigenous population at best had tribal but not political organizations. It would not be too easy to prove that the Britishers were infringing on the natural law (or on God-given rights) when they started to colonize Australia. Whatever may be the case, the colony *in the classic sense of the term* was a city or a whole area settled by people from a “motherland” (*metropolis*) speaking the same language, adhering to the same laws, praying to the same gods as the people in the motherland. In the remote past their independence usually resulted from the impossibility of long-distance administration. Political decisions had to be made on the spot without much delay. In antiquity independence always evolved in an organic process. The moral and emotional ties between motherland and colony were rarely broken. As a result, military alliance was the rule rather than the exception.

In spite of the American War of Independence, (often referred to as the “American Revolution” starting the “American Experiment”), the relationship between America and Britain falls entirely into the category of *classic colony* where people of the same culture, language, and civilization, with equal intellectual and moral levels, are separated by a considerable geographic distance. Any equation of the secession



of the Thirteen Colonies with, let us say, the “War of Liberation of the Peoples of Angola” is based on complete ignorance of the facts.

A *second* type of colony is the one found in isolated spots. Here the purpose of colonization is merely one of civil or military communications.

The *third* type of colony very frequent until recently, had a relatively numerous local population of a manifestly lower culture and civilization than the motherland. The former Belgian Congo would be a case in point.

Now, there exists a school of thought which hesitates to talk about higher and lower cultures. We, of course, use the term culture in the German sense, now generally adopted by the English-speaking nations: the intellectual, moral, and artistic status of nations as opposed to their civilization, which includes the civic (political) institutions and the servile arts. Obviously there are domains which do not fit neatly into one category or the other: Sanitation and industry obviously belong to civilization; religion, painting, and poetry to culture; jurisprudence and table manners to both. High levels of culture and civilization are related, but do not operate in synchomesh. Often history shows us great discrepancies between both, among persons as well as entire nations.

In talking about levels we need measuring rods. We need standards. The assumption that Western *culture*, in its present stage, is inherently superior to others is not easily proved. I am convinced of it, but I have to omit a lengthy argument here. Still, I want to go on record as affirming that the overwhelming part of mankind wants to adopt Western culture and, even more so, Western civilization—if not in all, at least in many or most of its aspects. (I will return to that theme). In occupying and administering areas inhabited by primitives and semiprimitives (central Africa, to quote an instance), the Western powers were driven to their colonization by psychological motives (“national pride”, expansive patriotism, etc.) as well as by practical considerations, i.e., advantages of a military or economic nature. Nor were altruistic motives entirely absent. Missionary zeal as well as a desire to help these populations from a medical, educational, and civic point of view—they all played their part.

*Fourth* and finally, we had colonies whose populations had a culture and civilization as old as ours, if not older. These nations either had stagnant cultures or civilizations, or both. The technological side of their civilizations ceased to develop and this particular inferiority resulted in the conquest of their ancient states by Europeans.

There exists, however, a curious interconnection between culture and

civilization. There can be hostility and conflict between them (as is evident if we put the masses of our big cities under the magnifying glass), but they cannot exist too far apart either. Jointly they form (to use an expression of Arthur Koestler) a “package deal” which precludes the possibility of taking individual items arbitrarily and successfully out of their compounds. The European masters of these old and proud nations (our fourth type of colony) usually tried to provide them with the blessings of Western civilization rather than culture, but soon the desire for cultural assimilation (within arbitrary limits) followed. There is a real inner conflict between the study of mechanical engineering and the natural sciences and Buddhism or Hinduism, whereas in the case of Christianity, such an antithesis does not exist, except, perhaps, in the minds of leftist semi-intellectuals who have never taken the trouble to study systematic theology.

The American anticolonialist is usually unaware of the fact that his protest against the survival of colonies practically never can be based on arguments valid for the independence of his own country. The United States in 1776 were as cultured and civilized as Britain at the same time. Americans then were honestly convinced that they were “just as good as the British” and the same argument, on the other side of the Atlantic, was used by and large by the agent of the Province of New York, Edmund Burke. One has only to visit New England towns which have not materially grown since 1800 in order to evaluate the levels attained by Americans more than a century-and-a-half ago. The controls by London (humiliating rather than vexatious) were resented as insulting and superfluous. To compare Holden Roberto with George Washington or Patrice Lumumba, the embezzler of the Stanleyville post office, with Nathan Hale is ludicrous: to liken the *événements regrettables* of January 6, 1959, which grew out of a senseless riot of football fans in Leopoldville, to the Boston Tea Party or to Bunker Hill is an insult to the American people. American Independence, after a few difficulties, led to the progress of the United States in almost all domains, whereas the precipitated decolonializations of the mid-twentieth century have resulted in an endless series of calamities.

The average American has also partly been driven to his anticolonial stand by his switch from Calvinistic ideals to the very opposite of Calvinism, to Rousseau’s “philosophy” of the noble savage. There might be an added guilt complex because in the past so many noble savages had been brought as slaves to the American Colonies and then to the United States, though it is frequently not realized that they were sold by *Africans* to Yankee slave traders. (In many cases the blacks could

have been grateful to have ended as house slaves in Virginia rather than as human sacrifices in bloodcurdling ceremonies such as the *Zenanyana*, the “Evil Night” in Dahomey.) This conscious or subconscious guilt complex of Americans mingles with the suspicion that Europeans merely “exploited” their colonies (which, up to a certain point, they indeed *wanted* to do). The *dolce vita* of Europe was considered to be largely the result of huge profits from the colonies. Such gains had been normal in the more remote past though only in certain areas, as, for instance, in the West Indies. In the second half of the nineteenth century and in our age, however, the vast majority of European colonies ran in the red. Local budgets showed deficits, the balance of trade was largely adverse. Among the German colonies prior to 1914 only little Togo was profitable.<sup>1</sup> All the other colonies needed huge investments in road and railway construction, in machinery, in medical care, in education. A modern economy can hardly be managed by savages or slaves: It needs well-trained and even ambitious men. Eventually the efforts of the European colonialists would have borne fruit, but decolonialization came too early to let the plans mature and thus the colonies left their European tutelage before they became economically independent.<sup>2</sup> The problem of balancing their payments is now for the ex-colonies a major issue in the Cold War which is primarily but not solely responsible for the premature severance of their ties with the motherland.

The American protest against *all* forms of colonizing activity actually presents us with an interesting medico-psychological problem. Let us imagine a man forty or fifty years old, a man in his “best years,” who is generally respected, is proud of his achievements and his standing in the community, is happy with his wife and his possessions. This man has one great grudge: He is opposed to *parenthood*. He is proud of his ancestry in general but emphasizes that he has been conceived in shame and that a similar calamity should not happen to others. Obviously such a man would need expert psychiatric treatment. The American anticolonialist is in exactly the same boat. Without British colonialism his own country would exist as little as mine without Bavarian colonialism, or Indonesia (which bears a European name) without Dutch colonialism. It would be interesting to find out to what extent we are here faced with a modified Oedipus complex, with the desire to “murder the father.”<sup>3</sup>

American anticolonialism also supplies a hidden motive to the foreign policy of the United States. Too many Americans hoped for the eternal gratitude of the peoples liberated and released owing to American pressure. *Nothing of that sort, however, has ever happened.* Even the mater-

ial aid given to the “emerging nations” has not modified the attitude of these peoples or their governments in favor of the United States. Recall the speech of Senator John F. Kennedy in 1957 against France in favor of a “free Algeria”; the concerted efforts of America and Britain’s Labour government to “stop the Dutch” in Indonesia; the American activities on behalf of “Indian freedom”; the highly positive and encouraging attitude of the United States toward “decolonization” in tropical Africa. Then look at the UN record of the “emerging nations,” supported at great material sacrifice by the United States. More often than not we have seen them voting against the stands of the United States.<sup>4</sup>

Yet while not receiving any recognition for its moral and financial aid to these nations,<sup>5</sup> the United States has by this aid effectively antagonized small influential (not necessarily wealthy) groups of Europeans, turning them into fanatical anti-Americans and thus severely weakening the fabric of the Free World. These Europeans are not necessarily expellees from Africa and Asia—former landowners, civil servants, factory managers, teachers, doctors, and merchants. They might be their relatives; they might be people, even little people, who had lost their investments in overseas areas; they might just be patriots who hate the thought that their country’s flag had to be taken down somewhere in the big, wide world. The expellees very often had been *born* in the colonies, the mother country to them is a strange country and they felt bitter pain when they were torn away from their native soil. Many of them believed they had a mission among the natives. (Some of them actually were missionaries.) They naturally deplored the demagoguery of a small semi-intellectual minority. Others were victims of mob violence, of rape, mutilation, and other indignities as a result of the “decolonizing process.” And since decolonization is being preached simultaneously by Moscow and Washington (by Moscow hypocritically and by Washington sincerely), these victims of the Cold War talk about a decolonizing Moscow-Washington Axis engaged in a permanent auction, an incessant bidding during which the battle cry, “I can be more anticolonialist than you are,” can be heard all the time. In this noble-ignoble competition Moscow (with much smaller bribes) is almost always the winner, while the bill for this senseless struggle is being paid by Europeans and “natives” alike. It is on issues like these that it becomes eminently clear that the American left, spearheading this anticolonialist drive, is the *competitor* of communism, *not* its *enemy*. Competitors do not contradict each other; they try to outdo each other.

The negative results of “decolonization” could have been foreseen

easily. However, two legitimate views are possible on the subject of decolonization: (1) It was inevitable but should not have taken place at so early a period; and (2) it was not at all inevitable but happened in a historical impasse—just as did the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Indeed very few historical events should be called inevitable. We should be content to speak of greater or lesser probabilities, in extreme cases of “virtual impossibilities” and “greatest likelihoods.” True, it belongs to the leftist mentality to visualize a fixed point of historic evolution, a utopia behind which there is no genuine historical development but, at best, improvement. All roads lead to utopia which will be reached automatically, but intelligent people help to increase the speed of this evolution. “Progressive people” thus promote the coming of paradise on earth; reactionaries in vain try to delay the arrival of the millennium. (They are merely “turning the clock back.”) Actually the machinations of the left are often in the nature of a real fraud because they try to create the impression that the events favoring their cause were *bound* to come. But *if* they are so truly convinced of “historic automation” along their lines, why are they not waiting patiently and passively for the inevitable fulfillment of their Great Dream? This is a question legitimately addressed to the left progressivist no less than to the orthodox Marxist. Certainly, if you stand on the right, then rightly you have no reason to adopt such complacency.

I lean toward the view that decolonization was neither inevitable nor even desirable. I am convinced, however, that *eventually*, in the long, very long run, the globe might be federated politically and that such a process could have positive aspects as I shall explain in the last chapter.

The continued existence of the colonial empires would have greatly facilitated the federation of the globe because it would have aided the Westernization of the colonized tribes and nations, a process not completely terminated today but greatly handicapped and considerably slowed down. We must bear in mind that we saw in the European colonies by 1945 not only a steady advance of Western culture and civilization, but also the growth of education and an increase in local self-government. As a matter of fact, in the years immediately following World War II Europeans emigrated in increasing numbers to the colonies, and when we ask where the most dynamic Europeans could then be found, where the great modern and thriving European cities were located, we would have had to point to Léopoldville and Dakar, Singapore and Hongkong, Casablanca and Lourenço Marques, Luanda and



Algiers, Elizabethville and Nairobi, Hanoi and Bombay. Here the energies and the adventurous spirit of the Old World found their concrete expression; here we had the counterpart to the American drive toward the West and the Russian drive toward the East.

There is every reason to believe that if this process had gone on uninterruptedly the Europeanization, linguistic and cultural, of the original primitive nations and tribes and also of the peoples with an ancient culture would have progressed in a far more organic way than at present. The process, to be sure, is still going on because the common denominator of the globe continues to be Western. Even China, with all its frantic Red nationalism, is only succumbing to one of the most primitive by-products of the Western mind, to Marxism. And in spite of the official program to replace English eventually with Hindi as the official language, English is steadily winning and is actually the uniting bond of India. India, in fact, is as unimaginable as a unified country without the preceding British *Raj* as the *Republik Indonesia* without Dutch rule. The “emerging nations” of Africa owe whatever cohesion they have not at all to tribal customs, traditions, or boundaries, but to European administrations and European languages. A *Nigerien* (a citizen of the *République du Niger*—provided he is Europeanized, *évolué*), differs from an educated North Nigerian (a citizen of formerly British Nigeria) by the fact that he uses French for intellectual purposes while the latter has adopted English as a vehicle of “advanced thought.” Both might belong to the same tribe, the same “race,” and one might speak in the same idiom to their less literate or even illiterate friends or members of the family. In other words, the “emerging nations” in most cases (Ethiopia and Cambodia, for instance, would naturally be exceptions) are European creations. They were obviously not designed as such, but they still are the product of treaties of European powers. They received their very shape as a result of boundary arrangements between European nations. In other words, they were, in a way, extensions of European states and thus, in a way, could be considered as constituting preparatory steps for the unification of the world. And while free (and “Colonial”) Europe after World War II groped desperately for its unity, the colonies not only seceded (prompted by the USA and USSR) but went through the process of fragmentation and “balkanization” that we had already witnessed after the “liberation” of Iberic America. In 1920 all of Africa was under eight flags. It is now subject to no less than forty governments. French Indochina broke up into four states, British India into three or four.<sup>6</sup> In this respect decolonization was a *recessive movement*, in contradic-

tion to a great many ideas and ideals professed by the American left.

A great many other features of decolonization were also antiprogressive and recessive. Before we deal with the desirability of the Westernization inaugurated by the European powers, we have to ask the preliminary question whether the Afro-Asians *wanted* to be Westernized: a legitimate question because nations should decide whether they really like to be subjected to a specific evolutionary process. Talking in Africa to *évolués*, highly critical of “colonialism,” I very often asked point-blank whether they would have considered it preferable if, 200 years ago, we Europeans had put a *cordon sanitaire* around Africa, leaving it to its own evolution unaided by the immense knowledge and experience we had acquired and accumulated—at great cost, at great pains, in the last three thousand years. A few extreme nationalists explained to me with profound conviction that, left to their own devices, they would have achieved the same inventions, the same improvements, the same advances, but the vast majority, less possessed by brazen optimism, were usually put on the spot. A few even admitted that in all likelihood they would not even exist, since the substantial decrease in mortality and the phenomenal increase in population were gifts of the medical services introduced by the Europeans. The unqualified “yes” to European civilization was, to be true, not always followed by the same enthusiastic assent for European culture. In most of the “emerging nations” the belief exists that one might opt for one and not the other, but this is true only to a very limited extent. One can, for instance, ride a bicycle half or three-quarters naked, one can read Plato (though not in Linguala!) and eat couscous, one can use the most modern automatic rifle and, at the same time, practice cannibalism which might be defined as “nutritional democracy.” There are, however, certain limits to these arbitrary selections from what, as Arthur Koestler pointed out, in reality are *package deals*.

In the Congo one was well aware of this in the good old days of Belgian rule when one made a trip from Usumbura to Bukavu and saw the large number of cars stranded and deserted on the wayside. Such sights were rare in the environs of Elizabethville for the simple reason that the population of Katanga had close contacts with technology and had been industrialized for two to three generations. The people from Upper Katanga had gone through the school of applied Aristotelianism without knowing it. They had genuine knowledge of the connection between cause and effect. They realized, for instance, that if one of the foremen in the foundry made a grave error in timing or calculation, this might result in grave material loss or in the death of several people.

The Upper Katangese industrial worker whose car stalled did not call for a medicine man to dance around and imprecate the evil spirits to depart. He lifted the hood, investigated the wires and spark plugs, tested the carburetor and water pump. In short he looked for the *reason* for the trouble. This of course, leads us to the statement that Europe and North America owe their phenomenal technological rise—which gave them the edge over much older, more cultured and more numerous nations—to their acute sense of objective reality (resting on the triad of Aristotelianism, scholasticism, and rationalism), as well as to their assent to the Biblical command to dominate the Earth, to make it subservient. However, I have written of this elsewhere.<sup>7</sup>

All this does not mean that Afro-Asians have always and everywhere accepted most forms of Westernization with open arms and immediate joy. This happened only after a longer acquaintance with these values, inventions, and institutions: They came to desire them. As a matter of fact, the remark is very often heard in Africa and Asia that the colonizing powers did *too little* in imparting these values: Their educational effort was too haphazard, their medical services not sufficiently comprehensive, their road-building program too sketchy, their slum clearance not effective enough, their granting of self-government (autonomy) too slow. The American left has always been extremely vocal in denouncing the colonial powers for their egotism, their selfishness, their neglect, their “exploitation,” their “undemocratic” ways of dealing with “natives.” And, unfortunately, since these leftists control so much of the press and the other mass media, they were frequently seconded by well-meaning good Americans who otherwise are not leftists by conviction.

This colossal misunderstanding (sometimes amounting to a truly wilful falsification of facts) was evident in the case of the independence of the Belgian Congo and the subsequent catastrophic developments. First of all, it must be borne in mind that the Belgian Congo is located in “darkest Africa”—in other words, in an area which was among the last to be explored. It contains the least civilized and the most primitive tribes if we exclude the Bakongos, who had a political organization in the late Middle Ages around the mouth of the Congo and northernmost Angola.

The earliest efforts at colonialization of the Belgian Congo go back to the last years of the 1880s and the subsequent establishment of the Congo Free State under Leopold II, when the Congo was exploited (and, we must admit, quite brutally exploited) by private companies. It became a colony only in 1908 and the reports of Mr. (later Sir) Roger



Casement decided the Belgians to make of their only possession a model colony. (European nations at that time had a free press and parliaments in which the opposition was only too happy to expose mismanagement or an inhumane administration. Whether they realized it or not, the “victims of colonialism” were morally represented in the European parliaments. The countries without parliaments were those with no colonies.)

The Belgians in the more remote past may never have contemplated total independence for the Congo. The avowed plan of most of the colonizing nations of Europe was not complete secession, but autonomy, and autonomy with equality. Race-minded nations had their doubts whether the natives would ever become peoples like those of the motherland, but others were more optimistic. The French wanted to make Frenchmen, the Portuguese Portuguese, the Spaniards Spaniards and the Italians Italians of the Afro-Asians. The Belgians were handicapped because they had an ethnic struggle at home which deeply divided the nation and also an ideological rift between active Catholics and anticlericals, antagonisms which had their distinct echo in the Congo. There were natives (although in a minority) who studied Flemish rather than French because a majority of the administrators were Flemish and not Walloon. Schools were either religious or areligious, and when the university age dawned over the Congo the Belgian bicephalism in higher education also made its appearance in the heart of Africa. The Catholic University of Louvain founded the Lovanium, the “free-thinking” University of Brussels, the “liberal” University of Elizabethville. Still, the Belgians did not spare time nor money to fashion the Congolese after their own image. Almost everything in the colony was run by Catholics *or* by *les frères*, i.e., the Masons, and people knew and in a way respected this curious duality. I doubt, however, that Tories and Whigs or Conservatives and Labourites tried to penetrate the Gold Coast or India ideologically, even if the British succeeded in getting hold of African and Asian students, westernizing them abroad in Britain.<sup>8</sup>

Official Belgium had a real plan—a wise and constructive plan about the Congo. Unfortunately “time” (which largely means Washington and Moscow) did not permit it to mature. The basic idea was to avoid the French pattern, i.e., the hasty establishment of a few elementary and secondary schools from which the best scholars were shipped to French universities where more often than not they became uprooted. The Belgians wanted rather to cover the entire country with a net of primary schools to provide the vast majority of the Congolese with a

basic education. After having developed the elementary schools, the Belgians started secondary schools and seminaries. Unlike the French colonial system, university education (which to Continentals is a graduate and not a “college” education), was also to be given in the Congo itself. The idea of the Belgians was to avoid tearing the young men and women away from their own land, for a life of isolation and miserable cold in Belgium (which lacks the warm sites of southern France). Their plan was to build universities around the Equator. We have mentioned two of these; a third was scheduled to be set up in Usumbura for the Ruanda-Urundi area which did not form an integral part of the Congo but was actually a United Nations mandate.

The Lovanium preceded the University of Elizabethville and both of these places of learning were provided with the best guest professors from Europe. In the very first years the percentage of whites among the students was high (a minority in the Lovanium, a majority in Elizabethville). There were, needless to say, no racial barriers and the universities were coeducational; yet no African girl attended before 1961 because *none* qualified! The administrators and professors of the Lovanium stayed with their families in Livulu, a village for racially integrated living.<sup>9</sup> In 1960 (when I gave a few lectures to the students) the buildings of the Lovanium together were almost four miles long and the university was designed to house and eventually teach more than 10,000 students. The University of Elizabethville was more decentralized. The equipment of the universities was first-rate. The Lovanium had an atomic reactor years before the University of Vienna.

The Belgians, indeed, thought that the main burden of the administration should be transferred to the Congolese, but at first no specific date was set for a more systematic takeover. The Lovanium was opened in 1957 and the University of Elizabethville a year later. When the fatal riots started on January 6, 1959, the Belgians were no less startled than the Africans themselves. It all came like lightning out of a blue sky. The “ignition” came from a brawl between two factions at a football game. This developed into an attack against the Portuguese traders in the former native section of Léopoldville. (All racial discriminations and the zonings were abolished in 1954 and the new laws were applied from one day to another without any protest.) The traders defended themselves with the usual Portuguese stubbornness, courage, and skill, but the army failed to receive orders to shoot from the Governor General who completely lost his head. General Janssen of the *Force Publique* thereupon delivered an ultimatum to him: “I will wait for three hours to get your orders to shoot, sir. If I don’t get them by that time I will

act on my own.” The Governor General consented and Janssen restored order with the *Force Publique* which, together with the *Union Minière du Haut-Katanga*, was considered one of the two great success stories of the Congo.

The *événements regrettables* of January 6 were not at all directed against the Belgians but they created a mood of unrest and were fully exploited by the forces of “anticolonialism” in the United States and in the Soviet Union. Suddenly people began to remember the brutalities of the rubber companies (which no longer existed).<sup>10</sup> Washington or rather the State Department put great pressure on the Belgian Government to “free” the Congo. The Belgian extreme left raised the same clamor and the government, in which the Socialists participated, declined to cling fanatically to this overseas possession; after 1957 (as before 1940) the colony had been in the red again. As a matter of fact only the Upper Katanga, that small appendix in the southeast corner of the colony, had a real economic value and provided almost three-quarters of the revenue. There also, work ethics had reached a somewhat satisfactory level.<sup>11</sup> The *Union Minière* (belonging to the *Société Générale*) paid with its taxes for about 55 percent of the expenses of the colony. The rest of the country (apart from the diamond fields of the Kassai Province) is practically worthless and could, from an inhumanly economic point of view, be dumped right into the Atlantic Ocean. As one can very easily imagine, a movement to separate the Katanga from the rest of the Congo had existed for some time because black and white in that province were sick and tired of paying for the glories and luxuries of Léopoldville, the very remote capital, as well as for the other provinces.

While the American State Department pressured the Belgians to give up their wicked colonialism, the Pentagon had rather different sentiments. The military men thought about the big base of Kamina and they had no squeamish anticolonialist complexes. They knew, moreover, a bit more about the realities of the big wide world than the leftist theorists. Yet, even in spite of the Republican administration at that time still holding office in Washington, the bureaucracy in the State Department prevailed and the Belgians, who had finally made plans to give full autonomy to the Congo in 1975, changed their timetable and promised freedom by July 1, 1960. They relied on the *Force Publique* which was to be officered by the Belgians as in the past. The vast majority of Belgian civilians were also expected to stay in the country. The leader of the Bakongo party, Joseph Kasavubu, was to be the President, Monsieur Patrice Lumumba, leader of the Lumumbist wing

of the *Mouvement National Congolais* (strongly centered in Stanleyville), became Prime Minister. This man had been indicted as an embezzler while employed by the post office. He had received another conviction for revolutionary activities but benefited from an amnesty. At the ceremony in Léopoldville, when King Baudouin solemnly handed over the power to the new local government, this petty thief insulted the *Bwana Kitoko* (The Young Master). Yet a few days later the red carpet was literally rolled out for him in Washington. (Maybe his theft was just a piece of “economic democracy”!)

Soon the mutiny of Thysville broke out. All order collapsed in the Congo; the Katanga region seceded. The Golgotha in the heart of Africa had begun thanks to the follies of Western leftist anticolonialists and the shrewd calculations of their brothers under the skin in the East.

Africa (and other underdeveloped overseas areas) are in a sense magnifying mirrors of the West or Gorgonic mirrors,<sup>12</sup> if one prefers. This is partly the reason why we go into such detail in describing the grim “evolution” of the Congo. The events in Thysville and in the neighboring districts and the mutiny of the highly trusted *Force Publique* simply were due to the change of authority and the psychological breakdown it caused. Traditionalists can make a most valid point here. When the pictures of the *Bwana Kitoko* were taken down in the barracks on the last day of June, 1960, and replaced by those of Joseph Kasavubu (who once upon a time had dreamed of becoming King of Lower Congolia) all authority had gone. The soldiers asked their (largely white) officers whether they now considered Monsieur Kasavubu their sovereign. When they got a positive reply, all respect for them disappeared. Joseph Kasavubu looked like everybody else. He was an “ordinary man,” a “Negro like you and me,” and this just did not impress the Congolese. To make matters worse, Kasavubu, unlike a King, was exchangeable and replaceable. He could be—with the aid of votes—hired and fired like a domestic. Of course, exactly the same reaction had taken place in Europe when monarchies were overthrown: Disrespect and disorder or fear and fanaticism took over. Hell now broke loose in the Congo. When the Belgian paratroopers arrived to save the lives, the health, and the honor of Belgian men and women, the Soviets protested against this “violation of the sovereignty of a nation,” whose existence could be measured in days and hours. Africa certainly cannot be ruled by abstractions—nor can most of the more civilized nations in the long run either.<sup>13</sup>

The reaction of the free Western press to the atrocities was worse than could be expected. Let us bear in mind that in order to be a “good

journalist'' it is apparently not sufficient to be a good reporter or to have access to a certain amount of ''inside information'' (which, more often than not, cannot be checked easily). Above all, it takes a thorough study of history, geography, economics, sociology, political science, religion, anthropology, languages, etc. In Europe at least, a very large sector of the newspaper correspondents and responsible editors have been to graduate schools.

But even so there is the danger that a half-baked element with scanty education, little experience of the world, and badly grounded knowledge may get access to key jobs in journalism. (The handicap of the European press consists in the lack of funds; this results in *theoretically* qualified people judging world affairs *from afar*, which is just as disastrous as the ignoramus writing on the spot.<sup>14</sup>) And since the press has to work with speed, it is tempted to write and to inform in a way that pleases the public. The average reader puts a premium on writing skill rather than on a valid commentary. Thus the press has become in many countries a haven for the *terrible simplificateur* in the form of the leftist semi-intellectual who, more than anybody else, indulges in *fausses idées claires*, clear but false ideas.<sup>15</sup> For reasons which we have given elsewhere the leftist element is much more strongly represented among the ''foreign correspondents'' than among local reporters, and the reporters are usually more ''liberal'' than their bosses. Worse, the editors and newspaper owners in the United States and Great Britain suffer from an amazing inferiority complex. They often feel themselves not sufficiently ''progressive'' and with a sigh leave ''advanced views'' to the younger men who (so they think) understand better the shape of things to come. Thus, more often than not, they yield—with resignation—to their informants abroad and to their leftist commentators. Nobody in his right mind would call the *Chicago Tribune* a leftist paper, yet Jay Allen, correspondent in Loyalist Spain, provided this paper with the Red version of events. Britain's conservative *Evening Standard* featured cartoonist David Low, whose work was of a distinctly leftist inspiration.

In the case of the Congo horrors a large part of the press (and not only the notoriously leftist press) turned against the Belgians. They were accused of not having sufficiently civilized and educated the inhabitants of the Congo Basin ''for independence.'' First of all, it has not been considered a primary task in the past to educate any conquered or incorporated area ''for independence.'' No doubt the United States is doing its level best to foster and promote welfare in Puerto Rico; It can even be said that it is aiding education in Puerto Rico in every imaginable



way. But it simply is not true that the United States is training the Puerto Ricans for “independence”—nor is the United States doing anything along these lines in Guam, in Samoa, or on the Indian reservations.

On the other hand it is a fact that the Belgians tried to build up education in the Congo: They had to start from rock bottom. Yet it is impossible to provide one of the world’s most primitive regions with an intelligentsia within fifty years and with men sufficiently trained to take over the administration of 20,000,000 people in an area three times the size of Texas. The Indians in the Southwest have been wards of the United States ever since the middle of the nineteenth century. I have lived among them and studied several tribes, and there can be little doubt that many of them originally had a level of culture a great deal higher than that of many Congolese. Yet, we may ask, “What is the level of education on the reservation today?” How many of these Indians have been trained to work at white collar jobs? How many of them are professional men? The United States, with enormous monetary resources and relatively few Indians to deal with, could *theoretically* have done a magnificent job. We say theoretically because we know the tremendous obstacles, the immense human difficulties of Western acculturation. I am ready to exonerate the United States government, but why attack the hapless Belgians?<sup>16</sup>

It is interesting to see in this case precisely how the democratic dogma and all the other deeply ingrained prejudices (some of them not ideological in the concrete sense of the term but pertaining to American folklore) contributed after “liberation” to the criminally stupid and uncharitable judgments on Belgian colonial policy. The horrors of July-August 1960 (and many of the horrors committed later by revolutionary groups right through 1965)<sup>17</sup> were reported but considered merely as outbursts of rightful indignation after years of “colonialism.” All people are equal, all identical, people are “more alike than unlike”—and thus the noble savages of the Congo were “driven” to their misdeeds.

The fact that the I.Q.s of Africans *on the average* are a great deal lower than ours could not be accepted: It was contrary to the democratic notion of equality. And yet it exists, it has been established statistically, and it has nothing to do with race. *But it is there*. It is due to the fact that the child between the ages of two and seven—any child anywhere—needs a maximum of contacts with adults when the cortex of the brain is being developed. In the first two years maternal love is the most important factor and this the African child gets—regardless

of whether it is black, as in the Congo, or white as in Algeria. Then, about two years after the child's birth, a new child is likely to appear. The older child will be relegated from the back of the mother and left to play in the village, in the slum, in the forest. At the age of two the African child is superior to its Euramerican counterpart; at the age of seven it has the mind of a Euramerican child of five. This difference, this *décalage*, is scientifically established and it continues as the years go on. Needless to say, we have the same problem in our orphanages where a few adults have to deal with hundreds of children. Their I.Q.s are shamefully low. The African mother, to make matters worse, is miserably educated or even uneducated. The girl longs for motherhood and does not finish school—if she goes to school at all.<sup>18</sup> In most cases her parents are opposed to the education of females, and men are not particularly eager to get well-educated wives.

In other words, to begin with, Africa is intellectually handicapped.<sup>19</sup> Yet the American leftist not only overlooks the basic difficulties in educating decolonized people, he also suffers from a curious schizophrenia. On the one hand formal education is his great shibboleth and he “measures” nations by their percentages of illiteracy. (If literacy is taken as a measuring rod, Latvia should be superior to France.) He is a fanatical educationist. Yet, on the other hand, education from a political point of view seems to have no specific value for him. Sometimes he insists on literacy as a necessary qualification for voting.<sup>20</sup> The voter ought to be able to read a newspaper. Of course this no longer is really necessary, because radio and above all television can “instruct” him acoustically and pictorially. Sitting in front of his magic box he can decide whether he “really likes” a given candidate or not. And for this as well as for a number of other reasons the “emerging nations” have often dispensed with literacy tests for their voters. They deem it sufficient if, according to a purely vegetative principle, the voter is more than eighteen, twenty, or twenty-one years old and still “on the hoof.” A UNESCO study has demonstrated that *today more than half the world's voters* (admittedly many of them participating only in the mock elections of totalitarian tyrannies) are illiterate. They vote guided by mere animal symbols, for or against the rhinoceros or the parrot. American leftists are not in the least shocked about these performances. As a matter of fact, they often feel indignant if a government refuses the franchise to illiterates, as does Perú or, much nearer home, any state government.

Thus, neither the American left nor the various demagogues in the Congo were upset about the fact that a still largely illiterate nation

should go to the polls. Switzerland does not have female suffrage though educational levels for Swiss women are very high; yet the Congolese women were naturally permitted to vote. Actually, there should be no reason for a real democrat to get upset about it. Literacy alone does not guarantee knowledge. The mere fact that somebody can read and write does not mean that he has any grasp of the political problems his vote (however infinitesimally small in relation to the grand total) might contribute to decide. As we have said before, the twenty-one-year-old prostitute and the sixty-five-year-old professor of political science have one vote each. Equality and not knowledge, quantity and not quality are the keynotes of democracy; the Hitlers defeat the Brünings.

In this respect I received a wonderful object lesson when I discussed with a group of Congolese their forthcoming independence and the demo-republican constitution. This happened in Bukavu (Kivu Province) in February 1960. We sat in a restaurant and my newly acquired friends were MNC, men of the Lumumbist faction. "Your womenfolk, too, will vote," I declared. "But tell me now, honestly, what do they know about the Congo and the world? Have they here in Bukavu any idea what the Katanga is like or what the economic problems of the Katanga are, or what reasons the Lulus have to hate the Balubas? Do they understand the arguments for and against federalism in the Congo? What do they know about the Cold War, the United Nations, free trade, nationalization, educational problems, the issue of highways versus railroads, the world market in copper, uranium, and diamonds? Can they judge any of the issues with which the free Congo will be confronted—judge them seriously, not merely following hunches, whims, and emotions?"

One of the men looked straight at me and asked, "What about your country, Austria? Do women vote in Austria?" "They do." "And are the Austrian women capable of judging domestic politics seriously? And world affairs? What do they know about free trade, the United Nations, railroads, nationalized industries, the Cold War?" "I'll be frank—they know nothing at all. They repeat what they read in the newspapers, if they remember at all what they read. And so do the men."

"All right, then," my interlocutor replied grimly, "So why should you have all the fun of voting—and not us!"

This reaction was not at all stupid. He almost had me. Yet the answer is that it is not popular representation that makes a country tick, but the executive and the administration. Without its administration France would have gone the way of all flesh a long time ago. The intellectual



level of the voters and the politicians with the general franchise and a political Gresham's Law affecting the quality of modern political life has shifted many of the responsibilities to the civil service which still insists on qualifications, whereas elections and parliamentary life require neither knowledge, nor practical experience, nor wisdom, nor higher moral standards. A lieutenant in an army, a locomotive engineer, a bank cashier behind a grill—nay, a plumber, an electrician, or a traveling salesman needs infinitely more knowledge, more experience than politicians (especially in countries where party slates and not individual candidates compete).

But it is clearly the civil service which in the underdeveloped countries cannot be established overnight. A good civil service needs not only an intellectual infrastructure of relatively high quality, but also a sound moral fiber. A civil service which is competent but corrupt is as valueless as one which is honest but untrained. And inevitably when we speak of moral qualities we mean those emanating from the Judaeo-Christian tradition, and these standards are not universally accepted or at least not uniformly evaluated. The taking of bribes (to quote just one example) was not equally condemned in eighteenth- and in late nineteenth-century England: it was treated differently in early twentieth-century Germany and Rumania. It is not viewed in the same way in contemporary Burma and in Switzerland.

We have talked about the Congo at length because in dealing with such an area and its problems, the American leftist (independent of the degree of his anticolonialist fervor) is uniquely unqualified to pass judgment, to design a policy, to make forecasts. His handicaps in this matter are so manifold that it is difficult to enumerate them all. Let us, therefore, merely recall his basic alienation from the existing world, from *human nature*. About human nature he makes *two* mistakes: One is dictated by his Roussellian heritage and by his blind reaction to Calvinism: He overrates the character of the average man (i.e., his moral qualities). The other mistake stems from his utopian visions which have a global and symmetric character: He underrates human variety. Anthropology, egalitarianism, and identitarianism mar his outlook even more so than those of the European leftist.

His utopianism has other drawbacks. Utopia comes through *progress* and progress for him has an automatic character: It is one of the hidden laws of this world. Progress in his view and in the long run will always reassert itself even if, here and there, minor setbacks occur, engineered by evil reactionaries. Man is good, but reactionaries do not deserve to be treated as human beings. Thus the evils of decolonization are

of short duration (as in the United States). After a slight detour the emerging nations will be safely back on the swift uphill road of progress.

All comparisons are imperfect, but in certain cases the beginnings of a “national” existence can be likened to bad starts in individual human lives, to premature births with complications creating permanent debilities and physical handicaps, infirmities that can never be straightened out. I am convinced that Hispanic America suffers from such a bad start and that it will take much time, courage, and great effort to overcome its flawed beginning. Haiti is a second case of decolonization in the Western hemisphere, but under auspices so radically different from those in the United States that it is idle to make comparisons. Boston was, in a way, another English city in 1776, but Port-au-Prince *minus the French* was not another Bordeaux or Nantes. As a matter of fact, Haiti might be a prefiguration of what tropical Africa will be like tomorrow: A dictator demanding divine honors and exploiting witchcraft à la Nkrumah, the exhibition of the decaying corpses of murdered political adversaries to a frightened populace, the establishment of concentration camps (such as Fort Dimanche), a brutal police force such as the Tonton-Macoutes, spectacular if uneconomic new cities such as Duvalierville. All this would be possible in the Africa of tomorrow—though perhaps not in the same degree, because important sectors of Africa had a longer training and education by the evil colonialists than Haiti ever had. As a matter of fact, large parts of Colonial Africa never had *serfdom* (neither did considerable parts of Europe),<sup>21</sup> and it always must be kept in mind that Europeans were in many ways kinder to Africans and Asians *than to each other*. The victorious Americans were harsher to the Loyalists than the French to the Tonkinese. In many ways the British were more liberal toward the Hindus after 1854 than the Union to the former Confederacy. The atrocities committed by the Belgian adventurers before the Congo became a colony are nothing compared with the delirious horrors of the Spanish Loyalists or of the Jacobins in the Vendée. And we don’t even go into the savageries of the Nazis and the Stalinists, both of them boasting of being the heirs of the French Revolution.

All this shows that, contrary to the American leftist dream, progress is by no means automatic and that relapse into barbarism is always around the corner. It is true that there is a certain cumulative quality to material progress. After having made certain discoveries and inventions, man can make further advances in the same direction. Without Hertz and Clerk Maxwell there is no Marconi. Yet progress is not essen-

tially material—unless we consider an ultramodern concentration camp with a technologically refined human slaughterhouse more “progressive” than building such as the Cathedral of Chartres or Nkrumah, who watched television, more “progressive” than King Albert of the Belgians. Progress is the assertion and the ascendancy of virtues and of wellbeing (which in turn is much more than mere comfort). Progress, however, rests on spiritual and moral foundations which are not separate but interconnected. It is obvious that if you see in man merely a biological link in an evolutionary chain (as, among others, the National Socialists did), a soulless economically conditional animal (as the orthodox Marxists do), a state subjected mammal (as the Jacobins and the Fascists did),<sup>22</sup> then the accumulation of material knowledge might go on, but hell can break loose any moment. Every bestiality becomes possible and compatible with either general opinion or the opinion of the responsible leaders. If the horrors perpetrated by these groups were not greater, we owe this only to the still effective “whiff from the empty bottle” of a vanishing Christian tradition. Yet the typical American leftist is in the same boat without really knowing it. He is less of a logician than his brothers under the skin in the Old World and therefore is more subject to Christian residues. But how long will this last?

Haiti was decolonized before Christianity had struck deep roots and the same process has taken place in most of Africa and in parts of Asia. Hence we have to expect among the “emerging nations” nightmares similar to those perpetrated by National Socialists, by international Socialists and by the minions of Duvalier, who are Voodooists and spiritual grandchildren of the Jacobins. When the “long-suffering” East Indians were “liberated from the British yoke” in 1948, few people in the Western world knew history sufficiently well to have real apprehensions about a negative development. The horrors of the Indian Mutiny—the Black Hole of Cawnpore 91 years earlier, were forgotten a long time ago. Here again it must be borne in mind that not only had the unification of India been the work of the British, but that India had also been liberated from the rule of a Muslim minority. India did not pass from freedom to “colonialism,” but from Moghul to European sovereignty. There can be no doubt that the rule by London brought greater individual and national freedom to India than the rule from Delhi by the descendants of Mongol-Tartar invaders who were racially less akin to the Hindu than the British who, after all, are Indo-Europeans. When the British Labour Party decided to give up British rule in India the Moslems, who formed about one-fourth of the Indian population, demanded a state of their own. Since India was scheduled to become

a democracy where the majority rules over the minority, the pre-British masters of India did not want to fall under Hindu sway and the Hindus did not want to revert to their old rulers. The tragic answer was partition.

There was never complete agreement as to where the new border should be drawn (especially not in Kashmir). There existed, however, a considerable reluctance to leave large minorities on either side of the new demarcation line. The *Pax Britannica* had gone. Mass expulsions took place and they degenerated into the worst, the most fiendish, the most nauseating spontaneous massacres the world had ever seen. Diabolical tortures, the most nightmarish sex crimes, the most delirious blood orgies resulted in the death of *four-and-a-half million people*, perpetrated by pious Moslems and the believers in *Ahimsa*, “nonviolence.” Even Gandhi’s *Satyagraha* (fasting) could not stop the butchery. This incident alone—unthinkable under the British Raj—annuls the morality of such a form of independence. And actually, if one talks with the plain people in India, one finds very little enthusiasm for the present order. On the contrary, the old times appear to many as a Golden Age. Only a very small and very thin upper layer of politicians profits from this new situation, and this is true not only in India but elsewhere in the decolonized world. Again and again one meets people who inquire whether there is really no chance that the British sahib might come back. (A friend of mine was asked by a native in the Cameroons: “When is this *terrible indépendance* going to end?”)

There exists a myth—and not only among American leftists—according to which the wicked Europeans with their missionaries brutally invaded overseas areas (which they often did) in order to destroy the idyllic life of the innocent natives, a life without a sense of guilt, without disease, without fear and unhappiness—all blatant nonsense. They defeated and enslaved vastly superior civilizations which merely lacked the machine gun, civilizations of a much greater spirituality, intellectuality, profundity, with a greater artistic sense and a more balanced life than ours. That is nonsense too. Anybody who knows the world and has not been seduced into building up elegiac dreams about faraway tribes and nations realizes only too well that the Dayaks, nay even the Japanese or the Aztecs, if they had been technologically able to colonize Europe, would have established an iron rule resulting in lasting tyranny.

It is quite true that European civilization exported hitherto unknown diseases and vices to a few islands. Yet European know-how finally triumphed not only over the exported diseases but also over the far more terrible local ones. The accusation that only narrow-minded missionaries

gave to these “children of nature” a sense of sin and therefore caused them mental anguish is so silly that it hardly needs refutation. Most of these natural religions are based on choking fears—fear of spirits, fear of witchcraft,<sup>23</sup> fear of sorcerers, fear of gods. Take only one case, common in the highlands of New Guineas (Papua). There every mother must give birth to her first child in the jungle—which is also an unwritten law in large parts of Central Africa. She must then take the child firmly by its feet and bash out its brain against a stone. Then several sows who have litters are driven to that rock, and the first sow starting to munch up the little corpse becomes her comother. From the litter the poor woman has to choose a piglet which she adopts and feeds with her milk. Her attitude toward the piglet will also determine her moral standing in the community. This is her chance to demonstrate what a “good mother” she is. And this is by no means the most unappetizing performance in that area of the world: The sucking of decomposed corpses is far worse.<sup>24</sup>

Now, one might object that this is a “low” religion, a mere superstition of savages, and that nothing like it can be found in the higher religions of the East. Yet I remember a talk I had with a highly educated Hindu in Agra, outside the Imperial Hotel. He was a civil engineer and he had received part of his training in England. We discussed the British Raj and he admitted that it had benefited India in many ways. He added, however, that the provincialism and the narrowness of the British had been silly and harmful in many other ways. The prohibition of *suttee*, the burning of widows, is only one example. “If a woman really loves her husband she obviously wants to immolate herself. If she throws herself on the funeral pyre, she will be knocked unconscious in five to ten minutes, suffocated by the fumes if not actually killed. And then she has a chance of being reunited with her husband in another incarnation.”

“You mean to say that you approve of this? Personally? Now and for every woman?” I inquired.

“Naturally. Take the case of my married sister. Her husband had a quarrel with his father and committed suicide by taking poison, cutting his wrists and hanging himself. Two days later my sister did the same. After all, what is the alternative? There is nothing worse than to live as a widow, especially in the higher castes.”

“Were there any children?”

“There were three, but what are families for? They were taken care of.”

In cases like these one might raise the argument that such behavior



is sanctioned by religion, that woman by nature is made to suffer, that the Papuan mother practicing infanticide and the Indian mother engaged in self-cremation are committing acts which really are in conformity with their beliefs, that they knew from childhood what was expected of them. In reality, however, the Papuan mother is endowed with the same maternal instincts as Mrs. Grey or Mrs. Green of the Anti-Colonial League in Kankakee, Illinois. She *does* go through agony bashing out the brains of her firstborn baby, and, as I got my Indian friend to admit, his sister acted from a sense of duty and propriety, and probably suffered enormous anguish carrying out her suicidal act. Still the man relished his sister's heroism. Societies and religious systems, however, which make such self-inflicted cruelties a norm, have to be judged negatively. "Colonialism," which tends to eliminate these precepts, is doing a good work.<sup>25</sup>

Here, however, we have to put in a word of warning. These horrors are not "racially conditioned." *Ideas*, primarily specific religious ideas, were or are working against them. *Ideas Have Consequences*, to use the title of the late Richard Weaver's book. We have to ask ourselves whether we too would not still be indulging in such practices without Christianity intervening (whether, without the British Raj, *suttee* would be as rare as it is now).

The "destruction" of widows is probably an ancient Aryan rite; witness the account of Ibn Fadlan, an Arab diplomat who was in a Viking town in Russia around 920, only a thousand years ago. He watched the funeral of a Nordic chieftain whose corpse was put on a riverboat. The Chief's friend raped his bride in a tent on land and then had sexual intercourse with her on the boat. After this she was held in an iron grip so that an old woman called the Angel of Death could strangle her. Finally the boat was set on fire and the two bodies were burned together—a performance surely not much more humane than *suttee* or our own legal procedures in the Middle Ages.

What efforts it took even Christianity to overcome this pagan inheritance *internally*!<sup>26</sup> It was a slow process and a mark of *real progress* (the only kind worth mentioning). Every lapse from Christian standards brought its own retribution, an immediate relapse into barbarism. Jacob Burckhardt foresaw this when he spoke about the catastrophes to come if the level of our culture were to sink only "a hand's width. Then the pale horror of death would be over us and naked power would rule supreme."<sup>27</sup>

Here we also have to consider the "speed" at which the various nations progressed in different periods of history. It cannot be denied

that in judging such matters we have to use rather subjective measuring rods. If we view the first 1,500 years of Western history in our terms, we might arrive at a rather interesting answer to the question how long it took our forebears, after the collapse of the Roman Empire, to reach a level of culture and civilization roughly commensurable with that of, let us say, 250 or 330 A.D. Seven hundred, eight hundred or a thousand years? A similar question might be raised in connection with the termination of European colonialism in various parts of the globe. Of course modern times are telescoped but still it is evident that the old levels cannot be reached overnight. Taking this into consideration, a phenomenon such as *Apartheid*—we mean Big *Apartheid*—must be judged somewhat more leniently than it is usually done.<sup>28</sup>

The fact remains that we continue to move ahead along the road of Christian development—both as a faith and as a civilization—while the newly Christianized or un-Christianized nations are trailing. This is true morally, it is true intellectually, and it is also true economically. We already mentioned the fact that, from an economic viewpoint, the colonizing powers have rarely seen their plans mature and their expectations fulfilled. The reasons why the European powers clung to their colonies, as we said before, were psychological and military rather than economic—even when nations nourished great hopes for economic gain. Their loss of colonies, needless to say, was for most colonial powers a blessing only thinly disguised, since the colonies were more often than not a constant drain on their finances. It is significant that Europe's present prosperity coincides with the loss of her colonies. Now, at long last, the former colonial powers have a chance to reach the material standards of the noncolonial powers—Scandinavia and Switzerland.

Looking at decolonization in the last twenty years, we ought to liken the colonies to adopted children of European powers, children going through the process of puberty. Adolescence is always a difficult time for children as well as parents. It is usually a period when children start to become critical of the persons exercising authority over them. Not rarely their dissatisfaction is so great that they think it would be better for them to run away—from school, from the paternal home. They are convinced that they are quite as bright, experienced, and educated as their parents. Usually, of course, they do not carry out their plans because they dimly realize that their formal training is not finished, that a start on their own would be difficult, that it would be wiser to swallow one's silly pride and stay on.

But what would happen if just outside their parental home were two powerful men with fat wallets encouraging a promising child to make

the break? “The way you are being treated by your parents is a disgrace. We would never have put up with that at your age.” Matters would be worse, of course, if the children were merely adopted.

This is a good analogy if we think of the elites, the *évolués*, of the colonies as adopted children, while Uncle Sam and Uncle Ivan represent the powerful men who can fleece their taxpayers at leisure. Uncle Ivan’s subjects have no say in the matter and Uncle Sam’s citizens have been indoctrinated by the left. If, to make the situation more troublesome, Uncle Sam and Uncle Ivan were to engage in a real competition for affection, shouting at each other, “I can be more anticolonialist than you!” while assuring the child that it would be taken care of materially, the rebellious brat could hardly be held back. He would leave home, repair to a hotel, and write blackmailing letters, playing off one big man against the other.

The foster parents, for their part, are rid of an ungrateful child, have less responsibilities and expenses, but are naturally hurt in their pride and develop a real hatred for the seducers of their adopted child with whose plight they nevertheless do not sympathize. Let them now pay through the nose! And when the two seducers—one of whom has acted in good faith prompted by idealism while the other was bent on real mischief—find that their financial resources are now being unduly strained and appeal to the former parents to contribute to the support of their ungrateful child, the latter are not receptive. They well remember the insults and invective of well-meaning Americans (as, for instance, President Roosevelt and the then Senator John F. Kennedy)<sup>29</sup> and are reluctant to help the “underdeveloped countries.” Even the Italians were approached by the United States to participate in the aid to the “emerging nations,” whereupon the Italians quite rightly replied that much of their own country, the *mezzogiorno* (Italy’s Deep South) is in many ways worse off than some of the new nations beyond the seas.<sup>30</sup>

The aid now given can be viewed from several angles. If it were true that these hapless *quondam* colonialized peoples and tribes had been brutally exploited in the past and had also been artificially stunted in their development (as, for instance, the Poles were under the Nazi occupation), the argument might be raised that aid given to them is a compensation for the mistreatment they had suffered. This, however, is not the case. The usual outcry of the ex-colonials is that they had been insufficiently Westernized. They do complain about exploitation (as many Latin Americans do in relation to their post-liberation period), but here the dual question must be posed: What was the exploitation



of natural resources and manpower before the arrival of the Europeans, and what were the living standards before and at the end of the colonial period?

The Europeans and Americans have achieved their high standards after an immensely bitter uphill fight lasting 2,500 years. They have gone through agonies to arrive at their present levels. The Industrial Revolution is only one of the many periods of large-scale sacrifice. All this knowledge, all this thinking and planning and endless experimenting, all the fruits of savings, of studies, of scheming, of wars (*Polemos pater chrematon!*) have been put at the disposal of overseas peoples and nations, and in a sense, this has been done without charge. To learn, as we all know, is not always pleasant. Remember the Greek proverb: *Ho me dereis anthropos ou paideuetai*. There is no education without tears.

However, realities in politics are very often less important than myths. We have a widespread feeling between Valparaiso and Hanoi, between Jamaica and Zanzibar, that the wealth of Europe and the United States is due not only to exploitation in the past but to an economic servitude which is far from terminated and which sails under the name of "economic imperialism" or "neocolonialism." Rare is a man such as King Hassan II of Morocco who told his subjects early in 1965 that wealth does not come automatically with political independence, but only as the fruit of hard work. Early in 1961 a poster of the *Unión Republicana* could be seen in the streets of Buenos Aires which, speaking about the great natural wealth of Argentina and the misery of the masses, said: "We are poor because a treasonable government hands over the possessions of the Argentine people as a colonial tribute to her British Majesty."<sup>31</sup> It is obvious that this truly general feeling (which I had the opportunity to encounter in such different places as Egypt, Peru, Senegal, Cambodia, Ceylon, and Santo Domingo) is based on a variety of superficial impressions and on propaganda, not however on concrete data.<sup>32</sup>

Here we must bear in mind that humanity has existed probably for one-third to one-half million years and that living standards which we now call "compatible with human dignity" could be found in a few isolated areas of this globe only during the last 1,000 years and in a more general way in Europe and North America only in the last 200 years. The living standard of a skilled Swiss worker today is infinitely higher than that of professional people a century ago.

But this very recent and sporadic material progress is generally not seen as exceptional. Socialists violently protest that within a nation

some people live a great deal better than others, and we encounter in the last twenty years a mounting tide of protest against differences in economic levels between nations. Just as today the poor man is prone to blame the rich man for his own indigence and considers income differences as highly “undemocratic,”<sup>33</sup> such differences between nations are also developing into a challenge, a piece of collective impudence. The wealth of other nations is becoming psychologically an “act of provocation,” and the uncommitted left in many a Western country (and this includes America) is talking about *a real duty*, *a moral obligation* on the part of the richer nations toward those less well off (just as richer individuals ought to aid poorer ones). As long as this is merely a call for Christian charity, we have no quarrel at all with aid to the indigent. There are people who labor harder and are more inclined to a frugal life than others, and the same comparison can be made between nations. Thus the Italians took it for granted that the Germans who visited them were richer since they worked harder, saved more money, concentrated more on industry and banking—but on the other hand had less time for relaxed conviviality, for the *dolce far niente* and the *dolce vita*. The Italians envied the North Europeans for their money, but envied them in a civilized, moderate manner, knowing pretty well that the Northerners paid a price for it that the South Europeans were not willing to pay—in time, effort, and an ascetic way of life. There was no talk about exploitation. If anybody was exploited, it was the Northern tourist in the South who did not mind too much, until or unless he felt himself to have been excessively swindled, “taken in.”

This, however, is not the mood of many overseas nations who are in the shoes of a runaway brat. This lovable child is now blackmailing Uncle Sam and Uncle Ivan at the same time. We saw the case of a Latin American republic sending trade missions simultaneously to Washington and Moscow. Obviously a crucial reason—for the “generosity” of the West is the fear that in case of nonpayment the Soviets might “muscle in”—and vice versa.<sup>34</sup>

But this is not the only reason. The uncommitted left in America (far more so than in Europe) is promoting this yielding to blackmail on “moral grounds” and as a move designed to foster egalitarianism. Why should economic egalitarianism be fostered merely *within* the nation? Let us carry it to the international scene! There is very little fear or realization that all this penalizing of the hardworking element (on the individual or national level) will finally act as a brake to progress, as a positive discouragement to all extraordinary effort which alone assures progress.

There is another reason why the American left favors aid to the “emerging nations.” More often than not the self-appointed leaders of these nations belong to the leftist camp. Various types of socialism —“Indian socialism,” “African socialism,” as well as “African democracy”—are duly fostered. The handouts, as a rule, are given to *governments* and not to individual enterprises—often, to tell the truth, because the latter hardly exist. Thus the taxes of “capitalist” countries are used to finance leftist governments which, more often than not, are using them in order to (a) bolster up their oppressive regimes and (b) build up a war machine which one day might easily be used against their benefactors. Needless to say, it is a very different proposition to aid Nationalist China where not only an army is being equipped for the Western camp, but (as I know through repeated visits) the living standards of the population have been improved to the extent that we now have on Taiwan the third highest per capita incomes in Asia,<sup>35</sup> and this although *economic* aid has been discontinued since 1962.

Yet in many another country profiting from development grants the masses see and get very little. Certain sums disappear into the pockets of the oligarchy (which might be deep Red), others are used to equip the secret police or paramilitary formations to keep the dear subjects in check, huge sums are squandered on sumptuous buildings and other objects of no economic value, designed merely to raise the prestige of the ruling group within the country and the prestige of the “emerging nation” in the international community. It would be most interesting to learn the real expenses of the emerging nations incurred not only in the fields of policing and armaments but also in foreign representation. Today a newly appointed minister or ambassador in a capital such as Washington, London, Paris, Bonn, or Tokyo has to make at least *one hundred* “first visits” to the various foreign representatives<sup>36</sup>—which shows precisely to what extent the modern world with its alleged “progress” has become balkanized, atomized, fractured.

Still, although this misuse of funds from hardworking citizens (who never have been asked whether they want their monies employed in such a frequently very wasteful fashion) is regrettable, it might be argued that the erection of a sumptuous presidential palace somewhere in the tropics—ininitely more luxurious and costly than, let us say, the residence of the King of Norway—contributes in a minor way to the income of the natives hired for its construction. But obviously a sugar refinery would be a greater asset to an emerging nation’s economy than a presidential palace or a mammoth “Monument to Democracy.” (I have seen one in Southeast Asia, in a not at all democratically governed country.) In other words, these foreign aid funds are either “con-

science money’’ paid because truly progressive nations are ashamed of their wellbeing or have been made to feel guilty for having carried the white man’s burden in the past—or they are bribes. But are they effective as bribes? In the last few years the divine Mr. Nkrumah has received from the United States alone \$160 million, Ethiopia over \$200 million, Burma \$120 million, Cambodia—which threw the American diplomatic representatives out—\$367 million, but if we look at the voting record of these nations in the UN we will see that with few exceptions they are engaged in that popular overseas sport of biting the hand that feeds them. Americans should derive only a meager consolation from the fact that the Soviets also have “miscalculated” a few times and that the citizenry of the USSR is boiling mad about foreign aid—an indignation for which perfectly innocent overseas students, especially the Africans, are made to suffer. Talking to Russians and Ukrainians in 1963, I was informed that the economic situation in the USSR was so miserable because, due to the selfishness of the United States, it fell upon the Soviet Union to feed the starving two-thirds of the world. “And now ‘they’<sup>37</sup> even import these black students who receive scholarships which are 50 percent higher than those given to our own boys.” These African and Asian students have a real Jim Crow place for their studies in the Patrice Lumumba Friendship University located in an old barracks. I do not remember ever having seen them in the company of their Soviet colleagues of either sex.

To make matters worse there are cases when American dollars handed out as a bribe aid have been used as grants or loans to third nations. Yugoslavia, which tries to play a leading role among the “uncommitted” nations (the “Third World”), has tried to bribe its way into this illustrious society. While taking U.S. dollars with one hand she hands them out with the other. Thus the American taxpayer helps to finance Yugoslavia’s foreign policy.<sup>38</sup> Yet even Yugoslavia had to experience what the United States and, to a lesser extent, the Soviet Union and Red China had learned: that the majority of “emerging nations” have an extraordinary firmness of character. They are for hire but not for sale. They have the character of prostitutes rather than domestic animals.

(Why are the Soviets and the Chinese more successful with smaller handouts than the United States? America is more *envied* than the two Communist powers. China, moreover, is “colored” and the Soviet emissaries, as Russians, are less “insular.” The heroes of Dostoyevski are more “universally human” than the moralizing do-gooder types who so often represent America abroad.)

Apart from Taiwan, where the United States has tried with admirable

tenacity to correct her enormous errors committed on the Chinese mainland in the years 1944-1948, one sees little wisdom employed. In her anticolonialist policy the United States, under leftist guidance, has made mistakes very similar to those in her European policy. Here we encounter again the assumption (dealt with in the preceding chapter) that human beings all over the world are “more alike than unlike,” a piece of miscalculation always connected with the silly, “Well, how would *I* act in his place?” Yet the typical American (or Britisher or Canadian) is radically different from the typical or average Dayak or Khmer or Chinese or Tamil (or even Italian or Austrian): People in given situations in given countries *do* act differently. Although I have spent a total of fifteen years all over the United States, have read more Americana than the average American, know more about American history and geography, and have perhaps a greater affection for the real United States than many an American citizen, I am still in my thinking, acting, and reacting quite different from the average American, and I do not fool myself that it could be otherwise. As a matter of fact, when I wrote a novel with an American background a few years ago,<sup>39</sup> I did not dare to use as my leading hero a real American; I chose an immigrant. Soviet writers, who often have to concoct novels about the capitalist world, willy-nilly have to be propagandists, and they have provided us with works of fiction which are unintentionally hilarious in the extreme.<sup>40</sup> American writers, without undue pressure, have depicted the European scene and European heroes and heroines—and the result is usually disastrous. There was a whole crop of such books, plays, and movies published during World War II.

“Tragically typical” is the history of American intervention in Vietnam. The French can point out with bitterness that, as long as they were engaged in the struggle to hold North Vietnam against Communist aggression, the United States did not lift a finger to help. The French, like the Dutch in Indonesia, were convinced that Southeast Asia was not ready to resist the assault of the forces of decomposition and tyranny. They were obviously not afraid of *local* decadent ideas but rather of ideologies which either had failed in Europe or had established unspeakable tyrannies: communism, socialism, Jacobinism, nationalism, National Socialism, one-party tyranny of an authoritarian character, or nationalistic communism. And after the “Colonialists” had left there never was a question in Southeast Asia *or anywhere else overseas* of restoring forms of government or social systems which had prevailed prior to the arrival of the European powers. As a matter of fact, if such local, such “native” forms continued to exist (or coexist) under



colonial rule or protection, they now were crushed, persecuted, snuffed out. *So great is the hatred* of the new “nationalistic” masters for their own native traditions, so abject their admiration for the worst ideologies, for the fecal matter of the West.

The elimination of Dutch power in Indonesia under the threats of Washington, just as the fall of French power in Indochina, was applauded by the American left as an evolution in the direction of “progress.” Yet in whatever direction we look, we see that decolonization has never meant *material or practical progress*, nor even *political advance*. If we eliminate entirely the religious (missionary) viewpoint from our speculations, we have put at least these two aspects under the magnifying glass. The material decay is obvious and intimately connected with the lessened internal security through brigandage and revolutionary movement. Yet it might be argued that, had the Portuguese handed Java over to the native princes instead of to the Dutch, this return to local (“native”) government then and there (in the seventeenth century) would have been quite sensible. In the meantime, however, the globe entered a period of Westernization, and political independence in the twentieth century means joining a more or less Westernized society of nations. For this task the new ruling groups, classes, and cliques are not really prepared, the masses, obviously, even far less so. Whatever our view about the United Nations—and it is indeed a rather dim one we have to take—it is based on a Western concept: International trade, stock exchanges, currency regulations, the world of diplomacy, international traffic, cooperation between police forces, disease control and sanitary laws, international scientific bureaus and educational systems—all these are Western, Western, Western. The Sultan of Jokjakarta on Java in the seventeenth century could easily have taken over after a Portuguese evacuation of his domain, reassuming local rule with few outside contacts. Today the birth of a new nation means facing the entire gradually Westernized globe with its institutions and currents and cooperating with it. And for this dangerous existence in a strange world the new nations were and are totally unprepared.

The damage done by present-day anticolonialism, American or other, is enormous. It will take a long, long time until the ill effects of this premature birth will disappear. Countries such as Haiti, Bolivia, or Guatemala to this day are suffering from their acquisition of “freedom”—which took place a century-and-a-half ago.<sup>41</sup> Will they or the new batch of “emerging nations” ever recover? Or will they, like a baby, crippled in the process of birth, suffer from it all through their existence?